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WRESTLING WITH MUDS TO PIN DOWN THE
TRUTH ABOUT SPECIAL DISTRICTS
Sara C. Galvan*
Federal, state, and local governments encourage and empower special
districts-board-run, special purpose local government units that are
administratively and fiscally independent from general purpose local
governments. Special districts receive incentives, grants, andfreedom from
limitations (such as limitations on tax and debt) imposed on general
purpose local governments. Special districts are treatedfavorably because
they are small in size, which theoretically means they foster democratic
participation;are limited in purpose, meaning that states can tailor special
districts' powers to serve specific problems; and are viewed as efficient
solutions to specific problems. Though special districts have tripled in
number over the last fifty years, the rationalejustifying their favorable
treatment has not been thoroughly scrutinized. One obstacle to such
scrutiny is the difficulty in determining a metric of assessment: Too many
different kinds of special districts exist, and the scope of districts changes
constantly. An imperfect, but no less revealing, method is a close
investigation of one type of special district.
This Article provides one of the few in-depth reviews of special districts
in the academic literature,focusing on the Texas municipal utility district
(MUD), originally designed to supply water to unincorporated areas.
MUDs-the most common type of special district in the state with the third
largest number of special districts-embody both the strengths and
weaknesses of special districts. Texas's failure to address MUDs' negative
effects reflects our nationwidefailure to analyze and correct problematic
special districts. This Article discusses MUDs' formation, powers, and
scope, and analyzes how MUDs operate without real democratic checks,
have too much power, and ineffectively work toward their goals.
Throughout, it attempts to engage the central question in modern local
government law: the optimality of certainunits ofgovernment.

* Gallivan Research Professor of Law, University of Connecticut School of Law. I would
like to thank Robert C. Ellickson, Jeremy Paul, Sachin Pandya, and especially Eduardo
Pefialver, for their thoughtful suggestions, and my father, Eleuterio Galvan, Jr., P.E., for
introducing me to the world of MUDs.
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INTRODUCTION
If you have ever called the fire department, been to an airport, or strolled

around a business improvement district, you have likely enjoyed the
services of a special district. 1 Special districts handle a wide range of
discrete

governmental

functions-from

local matters

like

emergency

services or library maintenance to regional matters like irrigation, flood
control, and transportation. Despite having myriad missions, all special
districts share the same basic structure: They are board-run, special purpose
local government units that are administratively and fiscally independent
from general purpose governments. 2
Special districts also share in

1. The terms special district, special service district, limited purpose district, and
special purpose district will be used interchangeably in this Article; all exclude school
districts.
2. For classic definitions of special districts, see 1 U.S. Advisory Comm'n on
Intergovernmental Relations, Regional Decision Making: New Strategies for Substate
Districts-Substate Regionalism and the Federal System 20 (1973) ("Independent special
districts are limited purpose governmental units which exist as separate corporate entities
and which have substantial fiscal and administrative independence from.., local
governments.... They possess the corporate power necessary to perform their activities; are
governed by a board of directors, trustees, commissioners, etc .... and are authorized to raise
revenue from one or more sources."); see also John C. Bollens, Special District
Governments in the United States 1 (1957) ("They are organized entities, possessing a
structural form, an official name, perpetual succession, and the rights to sue and be sued, to
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significant support from policies that encourage their proliferation and
empower them with broad capabilities.
This Article focuses on the favorable treatment of the special district.
Three concepts may explain such treatment: democracy, limited power, and
efficiency. First, in theory, special districts are among the most democratic
forms of governance--closer to the people by virtue of their small size.
Second, special districts are limited in purpose, which means that states can
tailor districts' powers to solve a specific problem. Finally, special districts
can supposedly target a defined geographic area more efficiently than
general purpose governments. For these reasons, as a federal commission
observed thirty years ago, "[a]ll three levels of government have
encouraged the growth of special districts": 3 The federal government
provides incentives in its transportation, housing, natural resource, and
public facility construction grant programs and policies; the states release
special districts from tax and debt restrictions 4 and weaken the powers of
other local governments, allowing special districts to operate without
having to comply with local rules; and general purpose local governments
advocate for special districts as an easy solution for the toughest problems.
As a result of these favorable policies, special districts have been the
fastest-growing type of local government in the United States (as compared
to general purpose local governments, counties, and school districts) since
they first came to prominence around World War 11. 5 By 1952, 12,340
special districts existed in the United States; fifty years later, they numbered
35,052-a nearly threefold increase. 6
Today, special districts earn

make contracts, and to obtain and dispose of property."); Max A. Pock, Independent Special
Districts: A Solution to the Metropolitan Area Problems 11-12 (1985) (characterizing
special districts as follows: "(1) they exist as separate corporate entities, though they may
have been created under any of several types of formation procedures; (2) they are entrusted
with the performance of one or more governmental functions or proprietary services vested
with a public interest, although these may range from the operation of a mass transit system
to the control and eradication of noxious weeds; (3) they are entrusted with corporate powers
commensurate with the performance of their activities; (4) they are governed by a board of
directors, although these may have been installed pursuant to any of several different
selection procedures; (5) their jurisdiction, with few exceptions, is delimited by territorial
boundaries; (6) they are possessed of one or more revenue sources and financial powers
found in conventional units of local government").
3. U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 2, at 341.
4. Debt restrictions are placed on municipalities to prevent them either from assuming
too much debt and hindering the provision of current services or from going bankrupt.
5. Jon C. Teaford, City and Suburb: The Political Fragmentation of Metropolitan
America, 1850-1970, at 173 (1979) (describing how the number of special districts soared
during the wartime era, as the suburban boom compelled more and more metropolitan areas
to resort to special districts to meet specific needs).
6. U.S. Census Bureau, Government Organization 6 (2002), available at
http://www.census.gov/govs/www/cog2002.html (excluding school district governments).
By contrast, the number of general purpose local governments has held steady during that
period. Id. at 4 (showing that 34,009 general purpose subcounty local governments existed in
1952, while 35,933 existed in 2002). School districts, meanwhile, have dramatically
decreased in number, primarily as a result of consolidation: Only one-fifth of the number of
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in revenues annually (and have approximately
approximately $123 billion
7
$217 billion in debt).
Though special districts continually grow in number and scope, the
theories that support them have not been thoroughly scrutinized. Perhaps
the obstacle to such scrutiny is the difficulty in developing a metric of
assessment: Too many types of special districts exist, and the scope of
districts changes constantly. An imperfect, but nonetheless revealing,
method is a close investigation of one type of special district. This Article
therefore narrows the focus and reviews one special district in depth: the
Texas municipal utility district (MUD), originally designed to supply water
to unincorporated areas.
MUDs are deserving of in-depth scrutiny for several reasons. They are
included in the group of water districts that together comprise the most
popular type of special district 8 in a state with one of the largest total
quantities of special districts. 9 They are proliferating, growing in number
every year in and around Texas cities. MUDs' powers are clearly laid out
in the Texas constitution and statutes, and, because they have been active
for over three decades, their effects are observable. But most importantly,
MUDs embody both the strengths and weaknesses of special districts, and
the lessons learned from MUDs apply broadly.
Like other special districts, MUDs have become a favored form of
government. The Texas constitution was amended to provide for the
establishment of water districts in the early part of the twentieth century,
and modem MUDs were authorized in 1971 by the passage of Chapter 54
of the Texas Water Code. Today, about 950 MUDs exist in Texas, 10 with

school districts exists today as existed in 1952. Id. at 6 (showing that 67,355 school districts
existed in 1952, while 13,506 existed in 2002).
7. U.S. Census Bureau, Finances of Special District Governments: 2002, at 3 (2005),
available at http://www.census.gov/prod/2005pubs/gc024x2.pdf.

8. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 6, at 13-14. The Texas Water Code establishes six
different types of water districts, all subject to the provisions of Chapter 49 and one other
Water Code chapter: fresh water supply districts (also governed by Tex. Water Code Ann. §
53 (Vernon 2002)), groundwater conservation districts (Tex. Water Code Ann. § 36 (Vernon
2000)), MUDs (Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54 (Vernon 2002)), underground water
conservation districts (id. § 52), water control and improvement districts (Tex. Water Code
Ann. § 51 (Vernon 2000-2002)), and water improvement districts (Tex. Water Code Ann. §
55 (Vernon 2002)). Of the estimated 1300 water districts in Texas, municipal utility districts
(MUDs) far outnumber the other five primary types. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation
Comm'n, A Handbook for Board Members of Water Districts in Texas 1, 58 (4th ed. 1996),
available

at

http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/comm-exec/forms-pubs/pubs/rg/rg-

238_188886.pdf.
9. Only California and Illinois have more special districts. U.S. Census Bureau, supra
note 6, at viii (indicating that Illinois has 3145 special districts, California has 2830, and
Texas has 2245).
10. Texas Commission on Environmental Quality, Water Utility Database District Count
Report, http://www3.tceq.state.tx.us/iwud/reports/index.cfn (last visited Mar. 20, 2007).
This data was taken from a report listed on November 6, 2006, but note that this figure
changes constantly; MUDs are created, rendered inactive, and annexed every month.
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the average MUD comprising about 525 acres. I' In the Houston area alone,
four or five hundred' 2 MUDs comprise over 210,000 acres of land, or about
329 square miles. 13 This Article discusses MUDs' formation, powers, and
scope, siting the discussion within the larger debate about special districts,
This Article argues that Texas's failure to address MUDs' negative effects
mirrors our failure, nationwide, to analyze and correct problematic special
districts-those that operate without real democratic checks, have too much
power, or ineffectively work toward their goals. Throughout, this Article
considers MUDs through the lens of several normative frameworks: civic
republican ideals of citizen participation in governance; vertical equity, or
the impact of MUDs on different groups of people; horizontal equity,
including the problem of "givings" to well-connected developers; and
efficiency questions.
Part I of this Article challenges the notion that special districts facilitate
democratic participation better than larger units of government. In one
sense, special districts might be said to satisfy a democratic impulse: With
their myriad forms and purposes, special districts provide options on which
mobile individuals can "vote with their feet." Under Charles Tiebout's
famous hypothesis, the existence of multiple jurisdictions of different sizes,
and with different packages of services, allows citizens to exercise their
powers to choose where they live or work. 1 4 Tiebout's public choice
hypothesis, however, falls short in explaining the lure of special districts
because, as a practical matter, many citizens are unaware of special district
boundaries and services.1 5 Without prior knowledge, individuals cannot
truly be said to have exercised a choice.
11. Mun. Info. Servs., An Introduction to Houston Area & Other Texas MUDs 1 (Mar.
2003)
(unpublished
manuscript),
available
at
http://www.mudhatter.com/MUDFolder/Intro_2004.pdf (explaining that MUDs average
500 to 550 acres).
12. Mun. Info. Servs., Guide to Houston Area Municipal Utility Districts 220-23 (4th ed.
2003) (listing 594 water districts total); Ronald L. Welch, Revival of Houston Area
Municipal Utility Districts 2 (Nov. 2001) (unpublished manuscript), available at
http://www.mudhatter.com/MUDFolder/RecoveryMUDS-lpage.pdf (stating that in 2000,
there were 422 "active 'typical' MUDs (normal size and configuration) within the
boundaries or [extraterritorial jurisdictions] of Houston and other surrounding cities").
13. Welch, supra note 12, at 2. One of Texas's foremost MUD lawyers reported that
Houston-area MUDs represent more than 470,000 single family residences, 107,000
apartments, $9 billion in commercial buildings, and 52,000 acres of commercial property.
See A WBD FiguresProminently in Testimony Before House Committee Hearing on Natural
Resources Hearing in Houston; Focus Was on MUDs, Their Benefits and Concerns, AWBD
J., Fall 2006, at 19 [hereinafter A WBD Figures Prominently in Testimony] (quoting Joe B.
Allen).
14. Charles M. Tiebout, A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures, 64 J. Pol. Econ. 416
(1956) (discussing the efficiency rationale behind allowing diverse jurisdictions to present
competing packages of public goods to consumers, and allowing those consumers to choose
among such choices); see also Richard Briffault, Our Localism: Part II-Localism and
Legal Theory, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 346, 399-403 (1990) (describing the Tiebout hypothesis).
15. See Nancy Burns, The Formation of American Local Governments: Private Values
in Public Institutions 12-13 (1994) (describing the author's efforts to find special district
boundaries, including conversations with state, county, and local government officers who
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Special districts' small size may be a more significant factor in
accommodating greater citizen participation: They are sized such that
people might know someone on the district board, take advantage of
opportunities for community building, or otherwise become interested in
district politics. But, as the study of MUDs proves, size does not end the
story. MUDs fall short of the democratic ideal in both their formation and
their maintenance.
Typically, developers-not the general publicdetermine when MUDs are formed, how big they are, and who governs
initially. Once MUDs are created, few people bother to vote in MUD board
elections or take an interest in district affairs. In the absence of public
participation, MUDs' ability to influence the state law that governs them
goes unchecked. These realities raise many doubts about the democratic
nature of special districts.
Part II questions where we draw the line between general purpose local
governments and special districts and negates the myth that special
districts' powers always differ from those held by general purpose local
governments. Scholars and policy makers have justified the treatment of
special districts on the grounds that special districts are more like
corporations than governments and thus should be given wide latitude to
accomplish their goals. According to this view, there is intrinsic value to
limited government. Over time, however, special districts' powers have
broadened significantly; little effort has been made to distinguish between
broadly empowered special districts and the general purpose governments
they have come to resemble. 16 In one prominent example, discussed in Part
II, the United States Supreme Court extends the one person, one vote
exception for special districts to even those districts with powers as broad
as many general purpose local governments.
MUDs, the object of this study, occupy a gray area between general
purpose governments and truly specialized special districts. MUDs have
the power to tax and issue bonds, exercise eminent domain, obtain
easements, incur debt, provide fire department and solid waste services,
build parks and playgrounds, hire peace officers, and run elections. One
might argue that MUDs have effectively become general purpose local
governments. Their ever-expanding scope begs the question: When does a
special district become so far-reaching that it should be considered a
general purpose local government and limited in similar ways? Relatedly,
how can states increase controls over special districts without
compromising the independence and flexibility they need to achieve their

could not pinpoint such boundaries). In Texas, the legislature has recognized that many
people move into MUDs unaware that they are doing so; state law requires that anyone who
sells or conveys property within a MUD must give notice to purchasers that the land is
located in a MUD. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.452 (Vernon 2000).
16. And it has become more difficult to do so: Almost all states, for example, give
special districts the ability to impose property taxes. See George W. Liebmann, The New
American Local Government, 34 Urb. Law. 93, 113 (2002) (identifying Alabama, Alaska,
Arkansas, Pennsylvania, and Virginia as the exceptions).
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goals? 17 Using MUDs as a backdrop, this part will argue that existing
frameworks-including the Supreme Court's inadequate attempts to
distinguish between general purpose local governments and special
districts-should be modified to better distinguish between the two types of
governance.
Part III challenges the notion that special districts are the most efficient
unit to tackle the problems that they are meant to address. The perceived
advantage of special districts is their ability to impose costs on those who
receive their benefits-that is, the group of people living or owning
property within the district. But special districts have many negative
consequences beyond their bounds-externalities that are not factored in to
the calculus used to justify their creation. Moreover, having too many
small special districts leads to fragmentation, creating an anticommons,
which makes a coordinated approach to solving a large problem impossible.
A study of MUDs illustrates these concerns. This Article argues that
MUDs have many negative externalities and that MUDs are not the optimal
unit of governance to address the water supply issue that they were created
to address.
I. THE MYTH OF SPECIAL DISTRICT DEMOCRATIC PARTICIPATION

It has long been assumed that smaller units of government facilitate
democratic participation because leaders are closer to their constituents and
more people can have a voice in the decision-making process.1 8 One of the
more prominent advancers of the "small-is-better" theory is Harvard
professor Gerald Frug, who has consistently advocated for more
substantively empowering local governments and for "the reduction of the
scale of decisionmaking, since limited size appears to be a prerequisite to
individual participation in political life or at the workplace."' 19 Professor
17. See James Leigland, External Controls on Public Authorities and Other Special

Purpose Governments, in Public Authorities and Public Policy 31, 45 (Jerry Mitchell ed.,
1992) (posing this exact question).
18. See, e.g., I Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America 53-54 (Stephen D. Grant
trans., Hackett Publishing Company, Inc. 2000) (1835) (discussing the democratic virtues of
the New England town and observing that "[i]t is in the township, at the center of the
ordinary relations of life, that are concentrated the desire for esteem, the need born of real
interests, the taste for power and &clat;these passions, which so often disturb society, change
character when they can be thus exercised close to hearth and home and in a way in the
bosom of the family"); Kenneth T. Jackson, Crabgrass Frontier: The Suburbanization of the
United States 155 (1985) (stating that "democracy seems to call for government to remain
small and close to the people"); Briffault, supra note 14, at 396 (characterizing the link

between small governance and greater participation); Richard Briffault, Who Rules at
Home?: One Person/One Vote and Local Governments, 60 U. Chi. L. Rev. 339, 341 (1993)

(summarizing that "[liocal governments are often thought of as little democracies, providing
fora for participation, deliberation and collective action concerning a wide range of policy
matters").
19. See, e.g., Gerald E. Frug, The City as a Legal Concept, 93 Harv. L. Rev. 1057, 1069
(1980). Frug adds that to truly encourage participation, local governments must be both
small-scale and powerful: "Power and participation are inextricably linked: a sense of
powerlessness tends to produce apathy rather than participation, while the existence of
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Richard Thompson Ford also supports small over large governments,
believing that smaller governments advance "democratic government,
effective place based political initiatives, and civic interaction and
identification with the public sphere" and that larger governments are "more
distant, more bureaucratic, and less responsive." 20 Under this logic,
relatively small-sized special districts might be especially encouraging of
participation. Yet the realities of special districts belie this conclusion, in
part because they attract the attention of interest groups who want to
leverage districts' powers, and in part because the average citizen tends to
21
be disinterested in district activities.
In the case of MUDs, real estate developers have become their most
vocal advocates and have received most of their benefits. While the
regulatory capture story is not new, the surprising extent to which
developers control MUDs calls into question the many benefits given to
special districts. Many developers integrate MUD financing into their
earliest feasibility studies of a development project. 22 Developers support
MUDs because MUDs provide a vehicle for them to recoup initial
infrastructure expenditures: Typically, MUDs issue bonds in the amount of
the expenditure and immediately repay the developer; then, MUDs tax
incoming landowners to repay the bond. 23 Without the bonding and taxing
powers, MUDs would not be able to provide a wide range of amenities, and
developers would not be able to benefit from the construction of
infrastructure at low or no cost to them. MUDs thus make exurban
developments less risky-and more attractive-by distributing public funds
to subsidize private developers' efforts. As the Texas Commission on
power encourages those able to participate in its exercise to do so." Id. at 1070. As Part II of
this Article argues, MUDs combine both. More recently, Frug identified the special district
as a possible exception to his classic formulation, observing that special districts' "relative
imperviousness to political control increases the power of entities unaccountable to
metropolitan residents" and that "the multiplicity of entities and their technical nature
generate an unusual amount of voter confusion and apathy." Gerald E. Frug, Beyond
Regional Government, 115 Harv. L. Rev. 1763, 1783-84 (2002) [hereinafter Frug, Beyond
Regional Government].
20. Richard Thompson Ford, Beyond Borders: A PartialResponse to Richard Briffault,
48 Stan. L. Rev. 1173, 1184 (1996); see also Clayton P. Gillette, Regionalization and
Interlocal Bargains, 76 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 190, 200 (2001) ("Small jurisdictions promote

political participation, as recognized even by those who advocate more local attention to
metropolitan perspectives. Expansion of boundaries necessarily reduces the competition
among localities that is credited with controlling bureaucratic budgets and facilitating
monitoring of local officials. Finally, larger boundaries may integrate residents who likely
have competing preferences about the provision of local public goods, so that some
preferences, even those that do not cause spillovers, get frustrated.").
21. See Bums, supra note 15, at 26-27 (describing how developers control special
districts across America). In Arizona, fire service and equipment firms play a major role in
creating fire districts. Id. at 28.
22. See Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 11, at 4.
23. As the Rockwall-Rowlett Morning News put it, "Developers cheer the districts
because they can mean big bucks, are created easily and face scant local governmental
regulation." Paula Lavigne, Builders Call for "Summit" on Utility Districts, RockwallRowlett Morning News (Tex.), Dec. 17, 2003, at 9M.
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Environmental Quality (TCEQ) observed, "The developer is the major force
behind the creation and development of a district.... He may obtain a
financial commitment from a loan institution, hire engineers to draw plans,
employ attorneys to create the district, nominate the initial board of
directors, and oversee construction within the district. '24 As a result,
MUDs are, from formation through initial governance, in large part
controlled by Texas's real estate developers, not the general public.
In the long term, too, MUDs suffer from a public participation deficit:
Though the developer's initial board of directors may be replaced over time
by more recent arrivals, few people care about MUD affairs. The board
tends to run its MUD without significant public checks. A close look at
MUDs exposes just how this situation comes about and how it persists.
A. Developers' Formationof MUDs
Forming general purpose local governments is typically very difficult:
To do so, many individuals must come together to overcome a collective
action problem. Forming special districts, however, can be quite easy and
25
may involve just one entity or a small group of like-minded individuals.
MUDs, similarly, are almost always conceived, bounded, and created by
developers and their associates, who make the most of the lenient legal
provisions that allow for MUDs' formation. Authorized by the state
constitution, 26 water districts in Texas fall into two categories: general law
districts formed pursuant to Chapter 49 of the Texas Water Code, 27 and
special law districts named and bounded by stand-alone legislative acts.
General law districts follow certain statutory rules of formation, while
special law districts do not.
Under state law, creating a general law MUD involves four basic steps:
(1) a landowner petition, (2) a review by a state agency, (3) a city or county
review, and (4) an election. First, a landowner or group of landowners
24. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, supra note 8, at 35. Few in Texas dispute
this characterization, and most of the state's major newspapers have defined MUDs as tools
of developers. See, e.g., Sandra Baker & Andrea Jares, Baker & Jares: 3 Projects Get in
Motion, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, June 12, 2006, at D5 ("Municipal utility districts are
government bodies established by a land developer .. ");Janet Elliott, Voting Rights
Statute Tested:
Austin Water District Sues over Portion Dealing with Minority
Participation,Houston Chron. (3 Star ed.), Sept. 8, 2006, at BI (describing a MUD set up
"so the developer could recover the costs of installing water and wastewater infrastructure");
Ian McCann, Senate Candidates Debating Who's Out of Touch, Dallas Morning News
(Collin County ed.), Feb. 17, 2006, at 12B ("The utility district was set up to allow
subdivision developers to tax the homeowners to help pay for water and sewer services and
roads.").
25. Bums, supra note 15, at 31 ("By and large, [special districts generally] have been
efforts by developers to use public financing for development.").
26. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59(a)-(b) (declaring that the conservation and development
of natural resources, including water, is a "public[] right and dut[y]" and authorizing the
legislature to create districts to fulfill that purpose).
26. Tex. Water Code Ann. tit. 4 (Vernon 2000) (entitled "General Law Districts").
27. Id.
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submits a petition to the state environmental agency, the TCEQ, calling for
the creation of a MUD. The petition must be signed by a majority of
individuals who own the affected land, as listed on the tax rolls; however, if
there are more than fifty persons holding title in the proposed district, at
least fifty landowners must sign the petition.2 8 These petitions are almost
uniformly drafted by the developer of a new subdivision, typically a singlefamily residential subdivision on the outskirts of a major city. Second, the
TCEQ reviews the petition. The agency must consider the availability of
comparable services from other systems; the reasonableness of projected
construction costs, tax rates, and sewer rates; and whether the district will
have an unreasonable effect on land elevation, subsidence, groundwater,
recharge capability, natural run-off rates and drainage, water quality, and
total tax assessments. 29 Third, the petition for the MUD must be reviewed
by the relevant city or county government. If a proposed MUD is within
the extraterritorial jurisdiction of a city, 30 the city must consent to the MUD
before a petition is filed with the TCEQ. 3 1 A city's consent typically comes
as a matter of course 3 2-even, sometimes, in the face of widespread public
disapproval. 33 If a proposed MUD is outside the extraterritorial jurisdiction
of a city, the commissioners' court of the county in which the district is
located may submit written comments to the TCEQ. 34 In contrast to city
approval, which is mandatory when MUDs are within the city's
extraterritorial jurisdiction, the county court's comments are merely
advisory. Once the TCEQ approves the petition, it appoints an initial board
of five members, almost always comprised of those individuals listed by the
developer in the original petition. Finally, an election is held to determine
whether the district may be formed and to select the first permanent
board. 35 If a majority of electors in the proposed district approve, the MUD
is created.

28. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.014 (Vernon 2002).
29. Id. § 54.021.

30. In 1983, ninety-five percent of MUDs reportedly were in cities' extraterritorial
jurisdiction. Tex. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, A Handbook for Board
Members of Utility Districts in Texas 2 (1983). The author could find no such figures for
2006.
31. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.016.
32. One reason for this ready consent is that city officials might view MUD land as a
future annexable tax base. See, e.g., Chunhua Zen Zheng, Pearland Mayor Addresses
Growth, Challenges, Houston Chron. (Brazoria County ed.), Jan. 22, 2004, at 1
(interviewing the mayor of Pearland, who said, "We did consent to their [MUDs'] formation,
with the understanding that when they are built out, we would proceed to have a planned
annexation of their territory into the city").
33. See, e.g., Dan Feldstein, Proposal Raising Home Values-and Tempers, Houston

Chron., July 18, 2006, at Al (describing how the City of Houston approved a MUD which
had been requested by a prolific developer despite public opposition).
34. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.016. Texas has 254 counties, each governed by an
elected commissioners' court, which includes a county judge and the county commissioners.
35. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.102(a), (e) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006).
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While the process of creating a general law MUD seems arduous, in
practice a legally sufficient petition is rarely denied. 36 High approval rates
result in part from a close working relationship between the developers and
various levels of government during the petition process. Even cities with
power to reject a proposed MUD are.reluctant to do so because a MUD
creates development without an immediate cost to the city; the city can later
annex the land to augment its tax base. Another reason for high MUD
application approval rates is that the voter pool for the confirmation election
usually consists of a small group of property owners who are handpicked by
the developer. In practice, the developer often builds a few structures or
installs mobile homes during the early phases of development; the
developer then leases the underlying land at a nominal rate to a group of
individuals he hopes will become the initial board of directors. 37 These
individuals then sign the petition to the TCEQ, become "voters" in the
MUD, and elect themselves permanent directors. 38 While there are limits
39
on who may serve on the board, these limits are not difficult to overcome.
As a result, the developer will almost always have substantial influence
over the initial infrastructure development and MUD activities.
If the TCEQ is reluctant to approve a general law petition, or if a general
purpose government withholds necessary consent, a developer may ask her
legislator to help her create a special law MUD, exercising what has been
called an "end run around a reluctant government. ''40 Special law MUDs
are much easier to form than general law districts because they simply
require the passage of one bill and do not require approval by the TCEQ. It
is difficult to know how many special law districts exist in Texas, since
most bills creating them are not published outside the compilation of
session laws.4 1 The consolidation of all such laws in a new code, the

36. Telephone Interview with Michael Byrne, Bond Reviewer, Dists. Review Dep't,
Water Supply Div., Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, in Austin, Tex. (Nov. 6, 2006)
(guessing that "ninety-nine percent" of district creation petitions make it through the Texas
Commission of Environmental Quality (TCEQ) review process and suggesting that failed
petitioners turn to the special law process to create a MUD).
37. See Bums, supra note 15, at 26 (citing Virginia Marion Perrenod, Special Districts,
Special Purposes 47 (1984)).
A Synopsis 3 (Mar. 1990) (unpublished
38. Mun. Info. Servs., Texas MUDs:
manuscript), available at http://www.mudhatter.comN/MUDFolder/TexasMUDsSynop.pdf
(describing this process).
39. See infra text accompanying notes 46-47.
40. Mike Lee & Josh Shaffer, Developing Power: Regional Growth, Once Dominated
by a Few Tycoons, is Now Driven by Agencies, City Managers, Landowners and Average
Residents. Though Money Still Talks, Power Is Harderto Hold, Fort Worth Star-Telegram,

Sept. 1, 2002, at 1 ("The fastest route [for development] is through Austin, where the
Legislature has routinely granted municipal utility districts.").
41. See Texas Legislative Council, Special District Local Laws Code Project,
http://www.tlc.state.tx.us/legal/sdcode/sdcode.html (last visited Mar. 20, 2007); see also
State of Tex. S. Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, Interim Report, 78th Leg., at 58
(2002) (noting that there is no single source listing all special law districts in Texas and that
budget shortfalls apparently hinder the creation of one).
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Special District Local Laws Code, has been slow. 42 In any case, special
law district legislation often has three components: (1) a statement of what
type of district has been formed, including references to the relevant
portions of the governing law (for MUDs, Chapters 49 and 54 of the Texas
Water Code); (2) a legal description of district land; and (3) a statement of
the specific powers of the district. Many special law district laws mandate
43
that district residents confirm the creation of a MUD through an election.
Special law MUDs are first governed by the board named by the legislature
44
in the original enabling law.
B. Developers' Governanceof MUDs (At Least Initially)
Developers tend to exert tremendous influence over MUDs' boards of
directors, at least initially. As discussed, the initial board of a general law
MUD must be confirmed by the TCEQ. In practice, the TCEQ confirms as
45
directors those persons listed by the developer in the original petition.
Typically, of course, the developer advances only the names of persons he
believes will be sympathetic to his aims and willing to help him recover his
costs through bonding. 46 The Water Code imposes some limitations on
MUD directors' identities, prohibiting a person from serving on certain
MUD boards if he is related to the developer, another board member, or
someone providing professional services to the district; provides
professional services or serves as an employee to the developer or district;
is the developer himself; or is a party to a district contract. 47 Overcoming
these obstacles by finding willing allies is not difficult.
Developers using the special law route find controlling the board
appointment process even easier because the initial board makeup may be
codified in the statute creating the MUD, obviating the need for TCEQ
review. Moreover, special law MUDs whose governing law does not
require public elections are exempt from the provisions excluding certain

42. H.B. 3508, 78th Leg., Reg. Sess. (Tex. 2003) (mandating the creation of the Special
District Local Laws Code).
43. See, e.g., Tex. Spec. Dists. Code Ann. § 8112.003 (Vernon 2006) (creating the East
Montgomery County Municipal Utility District No. 8 and providing that a confirming
election be held before 2010 for the district to continue as a MUD).
44. A third, less common, method of creating a MUD is conversion from another type of
water district. The conversion process only requires the approval of the TCEQ and is
relatively easy to accomplish. Unlike the other methods of creating MUDs, the conversion
method limits developers' control in at least one way: The district's boundaries are already
set by the boundaries of the previous water district. They cannot be changed except through
the annexation processes described in Parts II and III of this Article. See Tex. Water Code
Ann. §§ 54.030, .033 (Vernon 2002).
45. See Telephone Interview with Michael Byrne, supra note 36.
46. See Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 38, at 3.
47. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.052(a) (Vernon 2000). However, this limitation applies
only to MUDs located entirely within one county, and, if located in the corporate area of a
city or cities, includes within its boundaries less than seventy-five percent of the area of the
city. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.052(a) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
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kinds of persons from serving on boards. 48 Whether they have created a
special or general law district, many developers also install a management
company that works alongside the MUD to exert another method of
49
control.
Texas courts have never satisfactorily addressed developers' close
relationship with the water districts they create, though the Supreme Court
of Texas did consider the issue in Quincy Lee Co. v. Lodal & Bain
Engineers, Inc.50 In Quincy, an engineer sued the developer of a water
district to enforce a mechanics' lien on the developer's property after the
engineer was not paid by the district. 5 1 The engineer argued that the
district, in contracting with him to engage in services affecting a public
improvement project, served as the agent of the developer. 52 Choosing not
to further analyze the district's agency powers, the court stated, "There is
nothing in Chapter 54 of the Water Code and we have been cited no other
provision that authorizes the [district] to act as an agent for the
developer." 53 In so ruling, the court focused exclusively on express
authority as the means to establish agency, ignoring the well-known legal
doctrine that apparent or inherent authority can also establish agency. If it
had given the issue more thought and delved more deeply into the realities
of MUDs' creation and operation, the court might well have ruled
otherwise. Quincy illuminates just one legal area where developers' control
over MUDs has determinative weight.
C. Lack of Long-Term DemocraticParticipationin MUDs
More troubling for a special district than the control of a powerful
interest group early in its development is the sustained absence of
democratic participation in special district activities over time. The notion
that special districts "have a high degree of public accountability" 54 is
simply misguided: Few people bother to vote in special district elections or
become active in its affairs. One political scientist estimates that after
formation, a turnout of two to five percent is "unusually high" for special
district elections. 55 Many people are not aware of what special districts do,
or where their boundaries-usually drawn without reference to municipal or
county lines-end. 56 As William Fischel has noted, the functioning of
48. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.103(f)(1) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
49. See Renee C. Lee, The Fightfor The Woodlands, Houston Chron., Oct. 8, 2006, at
Al (describing the management role of an entity created by the developer of The
Woodlands, which "will lessen" as the suburb is completely built out).
50. 602 S.W.2d 262 (Tex. 1980).
51. Id. at 262-63.
52. Id. at 263.
53. Id. at 264.
54. Bollens, supra note 2, at 1.
55. Bums, supra note 15, at 12.
56. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr., The PoliticalEconomy of Cooperative Federalism: Why
State Autonomy Makes Sense and "Dual Sovereignty" Doesn't, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 813, 826

(1998) (arguing that when multiple levels of government share powers, "it may be difficult
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special districts "is, with some justice, ignored by most voters unless
something goes badly awry in them."' 57 Even voters who pay attention
cannot necessarily vote in special district elections; in many cases, the
is limited to landowners, excluding other
franchise in special districts
58
residents or affected parties.
Although MUDs do not so limit the franchise, MUDs generally suffer
from weak electoral participation, 59 except when major decisions (like
annexation to a nearby city) are on the line. 60 Unfortunately, there is no
good way to measure precisely how many individuals vote in MUD board
or bonding elections, since records over the last thirty-five years have been
poorly kept. 6 1 This problem renders a determination of when the
developer's initial board is replaced by a "resident board"-one composed
of relative newcomers free from the developer's influence-nearly
impossible. 62 Without these figures, it might seem rash to assert that few
people participate in MUD affairs. But there is other qualitative evidence
that supports this claim. For example, we know that in some MUDs, board
elections 63 have not been held for over a decade because the seats are
uncontested. 64 When a change in board membership does occur, one
for voters to determine which set of officials is responsible for which duties:
intergovernmental schemes can be notoriously complex in their allocation of
responsibilities").
57. William A. Fischel, The Homevoter Hypothesis: How Home Values Influence
Local Government Taxation, School Finance, and Land-Use Policies 22 (2001); see also
U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, The Problem of Special Districts in
American Government 51 (1964) ("[T]he public generally pays little attention to the
activities of special districts once they have been created. Perhaps the most important
reasons [sic] for this situation is that special districts, once created, usually are free to go
their own way.").
58. See supra Part II.B.
59. To remedy this lack of participation, the TCEQ has published a citizens' guide to
water districts, urging citizens to "Help Your District Succeed: Participate!" Tex. Comm'n
on Envtl. Quality, Texas Water Districts: A General Guide 5 (2004), available at
http://www.tceq.state.tx.us/comnexec/forms-pubs/pubs/gi/gi-043-379907.pdf.
60. See, e.g., Beth Kuhles, Residents Want Woodlands to Become a City, Houston
Chron. (The Woodlands ed.), Sept. 28, 2006, at 1 (chronicling how 450 people attended a
meeting to determine an alternative to annexation for multiple Houston-area MUDs); Lee,
supra note 49 (describing how 300 people attended a MUD meeting after a nearby city
(Conroe) announced plans to annex land governed by the MUD).
61. The Texas Election Board does not separate MUD turnout from turnout in other
elections.
62. By the time a resident board replaces the initial board, the developer has recouped
his initial investment and can move on to another project.
63. The process for board elections is straightforward. General law MUDs and most
special law MUDs are governed by boards of directors elected every four years, pursuant to
the Texas Election Code by qualified voters in the district. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.101
(Vernon 2000) (setting out general electoral qualifications); Tex. Water Code Ann. §
49.103(a) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006) (setting out the term length). Qualified voters
include, generally, resident citizens over the age of eighteen who are registered to vote. Tex.
Elec. Code Ann. § 11.002 (Vernon 2003).
64. See, e.g., Emily Akin, Directors' Races on Saturday Ballot, Houston Chron. (Fort
Bend ed.), May 11, 2006, at I (noting that a water district had not held elections in more than
ten years because no one ran against incumbent board members).
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common method of transfer involves a director who, having decided not to
seek reelection, resigns his seat so that his chosen successor may be
65
appointed by the remaining board and subsequently run as an incumbent.
To make matters worse, absentee landowners who reside elsewhere or who
lease their properties to third parties, may hold director positions.66
Absentee voters may have fewer reasons to be familiar with the issues, to
be in touch with neighbors, or to have a sense of accountability to their
peers. Anecdotally, we also know that only a handful of voters vote in
special bond elections. 6 7 As a 2004 expert panel on MUDs agreed,
"Developers who plan to issue bonds must first win voter approval to back
the bonds with a pledge of unlimited taxes, even if the voters can be
counted on one hand."'68 But the long-term democracy deficit does not
69
simply consist of poor electoral participation.
Weak public oversight has facilitated numerous cases of fraud or
unlawful behavior on the part of MUD boards and individual directors. 70 In
2002, the Texas legislature investigated claims that Dallas-area developers
had received hundreds of millions of dollars in taxing authority from a
handful of voters who received free rent, jobs, or other benefits in
exchange. 71
The same legislative committee also examined one
developer's practice of annexing land belonging to other developers and
then splitting it off as a separate MUD, thereby obviating the need for city
or county consent. 72 As another example, directors of three now-defunct
Kingwood MUDs, located north of Houston, spent $1 million of MUD

65. Bollens, supra note 2, at 37.
66. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.102 (Vernon 2002) (mandating that board directors be
either qualified voters or landowners).
67. See, e.g., Kim Canon, Horsepen Bayou MUD Voters Approve $14 Million Bond
Issue, Houston Chron. (FM 1960/Spring/Klein ed.), Sept. 26, 2002, at 7 (reporting how just
thirty-two voters, with no opposition, approved $14 million in long-term bonds).
68. Richard Williamson, Special MUDs Have Served Texas Well for a Century, Experts
Say, Bond Buyer, Feb. 4, 2004, at 32.
69. Note that all MUDs are subject to the Voting Rights Act, which requires that most
political subdivisions comply with certain voting rules. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (2000). At least
one MUD has attempted to free itself from these requirements, on the grounds that they were
unconstitutional and imposed a financial burden and undue time delays. See generally
Complaint, Nw. Austin Mun. Utility Dist. No. One v. Gonzales, No. 1:06-cv-01384 (D.D.C.
Aug. 4, 2006) (arguing that the access barriers the Voting Rights Act set out to address had
been resolved in Texas and that the Voting Rights Act's imposition of costly compliance
measures prevented small districts like MUDs from instituting beneficial changes in election
procedures); Elizabeth Albanese, Texas MUD Sues U.S. for Bailout from Elections Law,
Bond Buyer, Aug. 30, 2006, at 40 (quoting an elections expert predicting that "Texas will be
ground zero for the decade's most high profile Supreme Court case"); Elliott, supra note 24
(describing the board members as all white, and the district as including 1300 homes, two
apartment complexes, a church, and some office buildings).
70. As the Fort Worth Star Telegram reported, "MUDs have a history of governance
problems." Mike Lee, Utility Vote Is Set for Today, Fort Worth Star-Telegram, May 30,
2006, at B 1.
71. Reese Dunklin, Taxing Districtsto Get Airing, Dallas Morning News, Feb. 25, 2002,
at 15A.
72. Id.
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taxpayers' money on frivolous lawsuits and other items, displaying what the
Houston Chronicle called "little or no concern for upholding the law and
safeguarding the public purse." 73 The City of Houston sued the directors in
their individual capacity, claiming that the money the MUDs had spent to
sue the city was obtained through illegal gifts which violated the state
constitution. 74 In other MUDs, boards have set extremely high rates,
refusing to explain such rates to residents. 75 If public oversight was more
substantive, more instances of managerial misbehavior might be thwarted.
While involvement of MUD residents within their own MUDs is lacking,
statewide participation is nonexistent. No statewide lobby on behalf of
MUD residents exists. Residents of various MUDs across the state would
have to overcome significant coordination barriers, as well as voter
complacency, to organize a MUD-reform lobby. Conversely, MUD boards
and developers are natural allies and have powerful advocates and lobbyists
working to persuade Texas legislators of a coordinated MUD agenda. 76 In
2006, MUDs issued 167 lobbying contracts--one quarter of the total
number of contracts issued by all public entities in Texas-worth up to $4
million and paid for by MUD taxpayers. 77 The problem with public
officials lobbying MUDs has become so bad that the lieutenant governor
and speaker of the state House of Representatives have called for an
analysis of the lobbying practices of local governments and potential
limitations on their powers for the 2007 session. 78 One group in particular,
the Association of Water Board Directors (AWBD), serves as a powerful
clearinghouse for Texas MUDs' lobbying efforts and biannually sets out an
agenda for the legislative session. According to its 2007 platform, the
AWBD opposes limitations on a water district's right to incur debt and levy
taxes, opposes new regulatory schemes regarding recycling or reuse of

73. See Editorial, MUD in Your Eye, Houston Chron., Dec. 13, 1998, at 2C.
74. See Matt Schwartz, Todd Upset at City Attorney over Kingwood MUD Suits,

Houston Chron., Dec. 9, 1998, at A33.
75. See, e.g., John Pape, Residents of Riverwood Subdivision Still Seek Relieffrom High
Water Bills, Houston Chron. (Fort Bend ed.), July 13, 2006, at 10 (discussing how MUD

residents felt the Fort Bend County MUD 19 board ignored their concerns in setting rates
nearly four times higher than the cost of acquiring water from the nearby municipality of
Richmond); John Pape, Riverwood Subdivision Residents Seek Relieffrom High Water Bills,

Houston Chron. (Fort Bend ed.), June 1, 2006, at 4 (describing how neighbors tried to
contact MUD management and the MUD lawyer about the high bills but received no
response).
76. Certain MUDs also hire their own lobbyists. See, e.g., Ctr. for Pub. Integrity, ExLegislators

Registered

to

Lobby

2005-Texas,

http://www.publicintegrity.org/hiredguns/reg.aspx?state=TX
former legislator John Cliff Johnson).

Oct.

12,

2006,

(noting one MUD's hiring of

77. Christy Hoppe, Cities, Counties Put Lobbyists to Work on Taxpayers' Dime, Dallas

Morning News, June 10, 2006, at IA (estimating a total lobbying budget for Texas's public
entities of between ten and twenty-three million dollars).
78. Id.; see also A WBD Figures Prominently in Testimony, supra note 13, at 19
(describing the testimony of MUD supporters before an investigatory committee and noting
that "[tihanks to promotion of the meeting.., the hearing room was filled with supporters of
the benefits of utility districts").
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water, opposes the creation of uniform or consolidated election dates, and
supports broader authority for MUDs in the road-building, parks and
recreation, and contract negotiation contexts. 79 Its legislative committee
includes four MUD board members, six lawyers from powerful Texas law
firms, and one engineer. 80 No discernable lobby serves as a "MUD
watchdog," and no natural lobby that might be organized enough to become
one exists. The influence of MUDs on the Texas legislature may help to
explain why some of the simplest means of addressing the democracy
deficit in MUDs have not been undertaken. Some of these simple solutions
include requiring that MUD board elections be held on statewide uniform
election days, giving individual notice to voters about special elections,
requiring that board members make their primary residence in the district,
or mandating that a minimum percentage of registered voters vote to issue
bonds (thereby preventing bonds from being issued by a disproportionately
small number of voters). For all of the reasons discussed in this subpart,
such solutions are unlikely to be instituted without significant changes in
the political structure and reforms that make the pro-MUD lobby less
powerful.
This part has clarified why developers want to create MUDs and how
they exert control over MUDs' formation and governance. Some might
argue that developers' control is simply an outgrowth of the laws as written
(and not that the laws are products of developers' influence), or that, even if
MUD laws were changed, developers could capture the process in some
other way. Free market advocates might add that developers should be left
to do what they want and that existing MUD laws already constitute
overregulation. But all of these critiques evade the central issue raised by
Part I. Developers' control is troubling primarily because the existence of
MUDs disguises the facts: One interest group controls their governance;
their formation, at least at first, serves primarily private ends; and long-term
democratic participation in MUDs is poor. The lack of public involvement
may be understandable for special districts that follow the traditional model
of handling a specific problem that experts are best left to address. But for
special districts with broad powers, such as MUDs, the lack of involvement
opens the door for widespread private abuse and capture of public entities.
II. THE MYTH OF SPECIAL DISTRICT LIMITED POWERS

As Part I detailed, special districts like MUDs may be highly susceptible
to interest group capture, a reality that contradicts the assumption that
special districts, by virtue of their small size, foster a sense of civic
engagement. Another assertion sometimes made about special districts is
that they embody limited government, in that their powers are always
79. Legislative Principles of the Association of Water Board Directors,
http://www.awbd-tx.org/legisprinc.html (last visited Apr. 22, 2007).
80. Legislative Planning Committee of the Association of Water Board Directors,
http://www.awbd-tx.org/leg-com.html (last visited Mar. 21, 2007).
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tailored to meet specific goals-an assertion used to explain the favorable
treatment they receive at federal, state, and local levels. Even one of the
most prominent local government law scholars assumes that "[s]pecial
districts are limited purpose governments... without general governmental
authority over the territory or its residents[]... [that] supply engineering
solutions to technical problems." 8 1 Depending on the relevant law, such
favorable treatment typically includes providing for the easy formation of
special districts; giving them significant powers to accomplish their goals;
declining to extend the one person, one vote requirement to their elections;
and freeing them from the state limitations on taxing, bonding, and
indebtedness, which might have prevented them from engaging in largescale utility projects. 82 To take one prominent example, many special
districts are free from state constitutional limitations on taxes (as well as
debt), on the theory that their narrow purpose renders their revenue-raising
authority more like assessments than taxes. 83 But while some special
districts are extremely limited in purpose and scope, many others are not.
Those districts with the most expansive powers tend to look and act like
general purpose local governments, without the attendant limitations.
This part considers whether the state's special treatment of MUDswhich includes easy formation, freedom from taxation and debt limitations,
and other incentives-can indeed be defended on the ground that their
powers are narrowly tailored to their purposes. When water districts were
first authorized by the Texas constitution in 1917, legislation empowering
such districts aimed to address a pressing need to supply water to outlying
areas. Over time, however, the powers of water districts have been
extended far beyond water supply, and MUDs now often function far too
much like general purpose local governments to be given special treatment.
State MUD laws give developers a potent tool-the establishment of a
permanent local government-that far exceeds typical development
incentives like tax breaks and zoning variances. After a critique of MUDs'

81. Richard Briffault, The Local Government Boundary Problem in MetropolitanAreas,
48 Stan. L. Rev. 1115, 1145 (1996). Briffault later says that special districts "allow people

within metropolitan regions to obtain desired physical infrastructure and related services at
reasonable costs without submitting to more comprehensive forms of governance." Id. at
1146 (internal quotation marks omitted).
82. Cf U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 57, at 31

("There are three basic aspects of State law which might be expected to have a bearing on
the incidence of special districts. These are State restrictions on: (1) the taxing powers of
local government; (2) the indebtedness of local governments; and (3) the functions and
powers of local government.").
83. Richard Briffault, Foreword: The Disfavored Constitution: State FiscalLimits and
State ConstitutionalLaw, 34 Rutgers L.J. 907, 938 (2003). State courts across the nation

have both permitted special districts to charge landowners "fees" free of constitutional
limitations and expanded the scope of these taxes. Id. at 934-35. Such rulings "appear to be
nothing more than municipal attempts to orchestrate an end-run around state taxation limits"
which attempt to get around stringent limits on governments' ability to resort to general
taxation, advocated by taxpayers. Laurie Reynolds & Carlos A. Ball, Exactions and the
Privatizationof the Public Sphere, 21 J.L. & Pol. 451, 456 (2005).
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powers, the discussion broadens to examine the main line of Supreme Court
case law that has considered the powers of the special district, albeit
indirectly: the so-called "one person, one vote" cases. This part shows how
the Court's rationale in defining special districts is inadequate in light of
ever-expanding special district powers and sketches new criteria for
distinguishing between general purpose local governments and special
districts.
A. MUDs' Powers Resemble Those of GeneralPurpose Local
Governments
Each legislative session, the powers of MUDs-originally intended to
serve as stewards and suppliers of water-are augmented. 84
The
management of water resources, in itself, leads to the assumption of greater
power than one might anticipate: MUDs can take virtually any measures to
supply water, collect and dispose of waste, control local storm water,
85
irrigate land, alter land elevation, and navigate coastal and inland waters.
In 2001, MUDs were empowered to create and maintain recreational
facilities, including parks, landscaping, trails, beautification projects, street
lighting, and equipment. 86 One MUD has even used its powers to beautify
a historic cemetery.8 7 In addition, the Texas constitution specifically allows
MUDs to engage in fire-fighting activities, 88 as many MUDs have, and to
issue bonds for that purpose. 89 Like any traditional local government, a
MUD can make contracts. 90 And like the typical employer, MUDs can
provide for retirement, disability, and death compensation funds and enroll
in workers' compensation insurance. 9 1
Almost all MUD powers extend beyond district boundaries. 92 MUDs can
acquire interests in "land, materials, waste grounds, easements, rights-of84. Because acts creating special law MUDs often mandate conformation with one or
more chapters of the Water Code, this section will make no distinction between general and
special law MUDs.
85. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.201(b) (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006); Tex. Water Code
Ann. § 54.203 (Vernon 2002).
86. Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 49.462-.463 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
87. See Anitra D. Brown, Cemetery on Cypresswood Drive Gets New Life, Houston
Chron. (Spring/Klein/Tomball ed.), June 15, 2006, at 1.
88. See, e.g., Zen T.C. Zheng, Sienna Fire Station Step Closer to Reality, Houston
Chron. (Fort Bend ed.), Sept. 21, 2006, at 4 (noting how the Sienna Plantation MUD 1 is
building a fire station to be used in part by residents of a nearby municipality, Missouri
City).
89. Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59(f). Under state law, district electors can approve a plan to
operate or jointly fund the operation of a fire department. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.351
(Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
90. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.067 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
91. Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 49.069, .070 (Vernon 2000).
92. See, e.g., Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.211(b) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006) ("A
district is authorized to purchase, construct, acquire, own, operate, maintain, repair, improve,
or extend inside and outside its boundaries any and all land, works, improvements, facilities,
plants, equipment, and appliances necessary to accomplish the purposes of its creation or the
purposes authorized by this code or any other law.").
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way, equipment, contract or permit rights or interest," 9 3 either inside or
outside district lines. 94 They can provide services to areas "contiguous to or
in the vicinity of the district. '9 5 In 1995, MUDs acquired the power of
eminent domain over any land, easement, or other property inside or outside
the district boundaries that is necessary for any of its projects or purposes. 96
In addition, MUDs can petition the TCEQ to obtain the powers granted to
road utility districts. 97 Even without formally being granted such authority,
MUDs may be able to issue bonds to repair and maintain roads; the
legislature has found that the condition of streets affects MUDs' ability to
accomplish their statutory purposes. 98 Finally, MUDs can contract for
peace officers, including police officers, with the power to make arrests to
enforce the laws of the district and the state. 99
As suggested above, MUDs, like many special districts, can take on
significant debt without complying with the debt limitations imposed on the
state, counties, or municipalities. 0 0 MUDs are authorized by the state
constitution to issue tax-exempt bonds to fund nearly any MUD project or
purpose.' 0 1 The bonds are typically secured by a trust or mortgage lien on
part or all of the physical properties of the district, 10 2 a pledge of ad
valorem taxes, and/or the MUD's general revenues. 10 3 There are some
limitations on MUDs' bonding authority. For instance, certain MUDs may
not issue bonds to pay for golf courses or pools. 104 More significantly, the
amount of most bonds must be approved in a general election, and the
issuance of the bonds themselves must be approved by the TCEQ. 105 The

93. Id. § 49.218(a).
94. Id. § 49.218(c).
95. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.215(a), (b), (e), (f) (Vernon 2000) (authorizing such
services, so long as they are not duplicated, and allowing MUDs to assess operating and
maintenance fees and issue and sell related bonds and notes).
96. Id. § 49.222(a). A MUD cannot use eminent domain outside district boundaries,
however, to acquire a site for a water treatment plant, water storage facility, wastewater
treatment or disposal plant, park, swimming pool, or other recreational facility. Tex. Water
Code Ann. § 54.209 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
97. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.234 (Vernon 2002 & Supp. 2006). Often, special law
MUDs are granted road-building powers without having to petition the TCEQ.
98. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.522 (Vernon 2002).
99. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.216 (Vernon 2000).
100. See, e.g., Tex. Const. art. III, § 50 ("The Legislature shall have no power to give or
to lend, or to authorize the giving or lending, of the credit of the State in aid of, or to any
person, association or corporation, whether municipal or other, or to pledge the credit of the
State in any manner whatsoever, for the payment of the liabilities, present or prospective, of
any individual, association of individuals, municipal or other corporation whatsoever.").
101. See id. art. XVI, § 59(c); Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.501 (Vernon 2002 & Supp.
2006).
102. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.504 (Vernon 2002).
103. See Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, supra note 8, at 8 (summarizing these
characteristics).
104. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.4645(a) (Vernon Supp. 2006) (prohibiting districts' use
of bonds for golf courses or pools).
105. Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 49.106, .181 (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006). No election is
needed if the board borrows money to be paid solely from revenues. Id. § 49.153(a).
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TCEQ now receives roughly 160 to 175 bond applications per year for an
average amount of four to five million dollars, and typically approves such
applications. 10 6 By 1990, $3 billion of bonds had been issued by Texas
10 8
MUDs;' 0 7 by 2003, that figure had doubled.
A necessary complement to the bonding authority is the taxing authority,
which can be used to repay debts taken on to build new infrastructure. Like
many general purpose local governments, MUDs have the legal authority to
levy a range of taxes. 10 9 MUD boards can set ad valorem property taxes
each year to pay for bonds and other contractual obligations."I 0 MUDs can
charge impact fees to recover capital costs for the construction, installation,
or inspection of a tap or connection to district water, sewer, or drainage
facilities. II MUDs can also assess standby fees on undeveloped properties,
either for expenditures already made (like debt servicing) or for operating
and maintaining facilities that have not yet been financed. 112 Finally,
MUDs can levy and collect taxes for operating and maintaining their works
and facilities" 3 and have the power to cut off services to delinquent
taxpayers. 114
MUD boards also have the power to easily annex land, whether or not
contiguous to the district, by petition of the landowners."l 5 If the board
finds that the annexation is feasible, practical, and beneficial to the area and
district, the land may be added. 1 6 In this process, no state, city, or county
106. Telephone Interview with Michael Byrne, supra note 36.
107. Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 38, at 3.
108. See Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 11, at 2; cf Williamson, supra note 68, at 32
(noting that all of Texas' water districts together accounted for $18 billion in outstanding
bonds that year).
109. See Tex. Const. art. XVI, § 59(c) (authorizing districts like MUDs to levy taxes to
pay for bonds).
110. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.601 (Vernon 2002).
111. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.212(d) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
112. Id. § 49.231(b) ("The intent of the standby fee is to distribute a fair portion of the
cost burden for operating and maintaining the facilities and for financing capital costs of the
facilities to owners of property who have not constructed improvements but have potable
water, sewer, or drainage capacity available."). Such a fee has to be submitted to the TCEQ,
id. § 49.231 (c)-(g), which will approve an application only if the fee is necessary to maintain
the integrity and stability of the district and fairly allocates the district's costs among all
landowners. Tex. Natural Res. Conservation Comm'n, supra note 8, at 9.
113. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.107(a) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006). A public election
must be held to approve such a tax. Id. § 49.107(b).
114. Id. § 49.212(c).
115. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.30 1(a) (Vernon 2000). The petition must be signed by a
majority of landowners in a proposed annexation area; fifty landowners must sign if the
number of landowners is more than fifty. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.302(b) (Vernon 2000
& Supp. 2006).
116. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.302(e) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006). Courts will
review board decisions regarding annexation by the lenient standard of whether the
annexation is rationally related to a legitimate state interest. See Mahone v. Addicks Util.
Dist., 836 F.2d 921 (5th Cir. 1988) (remanding to the trial court the issue of whether a MUD
board's decision to annex 147 acres of land, which completely encircled twenty acres of
unannexed, undeveloped property near the MUD's geographic center and owned by the
plaintiff, was rationally related to a legitimate state interest).
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has oversight. The State Senate Committee on Intergovernmental Relations
has suggested changing the laws to add a requirement that a municipality
give written consent to MUDs' annexation of land in the municipality's
extraterritorial jurisdiction, but no such law has been passed.1 17 Once
annexed, the new part of the district bears its pro rata share of bonds, notes,
taxes, and other obligations."18
Given all of these abilities, it should come as no surprise that MUDs
offer significant advantages to developers. The exercise of annexation,
bonding, taxing, and eminent domain powers could collectively be
considered regulatory and financial givings to the private developers who
take advantage of the MUD form. 119 In the MUD context, givings are
troubling because developers pay nothing to receive them and no public
oversight tempers their distribution. Equally troubling is the fact that the
most well-connected developers are most likely to receive MUD benefits,
raising horizontal equity concerns. These powers also reveal how blurry
the line between special district and general purpose local governments can
become. In view of their broad powers, it is more difficult than it might
seem to justify the separate and more lenient legal regime governing MUDs
on the ground that their powers are narrowly drawn. It is time to reevaluate
the MUD, just as it is time to reevaluate how special districts are defined.
B. Clarifying the Special District-GeneralPurposeLocal Government
Distinction
The legal distinction between special districts and general purpose local
governments is not without significance: Special districts receive many
benefits from their status. 120 Sometimes, granting these powers has
backfired, as occurred in the 1980s, when a number of MUDs, hurt by an
economic slowdown, defaulted on their debt service obligations. 1 2 1
Legislative reforms limiting the bonding power discussed in Part II.A were
passed, but for the most part, the powers of MUDs have only grown. Yet
Texas, like many other jurisdictions governing special districts, lacks clear
standards to discern where a special district ends and a general purpose
local government begins. Making this distinction is not easy, and even the
117. State of Tex. S. Comm. on Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 41, at 59.
118. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 49.302(h) (Vernon 2000 & Supp. 2006).
119. For the first full treatment of givings, see Abraham Bell & Gideon Parchomovsky,
Givings, 111 Yale L.J. 547, 549 (2001) (defining givings as "governmental distributions of
property," the inverse of takings).
120. See supra text accompanying note 82.
121. See Welch, supra note 12, at 5 (noting that between 1987 and 1994, eighteen MUDs
defaulted on $64 million in loans); Ronald L. Welch, Trouble on Tap for Municipal Utility
Districts,
Houston
Chron.,
May
17,
1987,
available
at
http://www.mudhatter.com/MUD_Folder/TroubleOnTap.pdf (describing the pending default
of Northwest Harris County MUD No. 19, which had to raise taxes nearly fivefold after an
economic slowdown dampened demand for lots, and which nonetheless could not pay for
debt service on issued bonds); Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 11, at 2 (asserting that only four
percent of Houston-area districts actually defaulted since 1988).

WRESTLING WITH MUDS

2007]

3063

Supreme Court's few attempts to do so have fallen short. The Court's
confusion pervades government at every level, and a new mechanism must
be conceived. The following subpart attempts to sketch a distinguishing
method in light of some of the issues raised by MUDs.
1. Difficulties at the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court has had difficulties distinguishing between special
districts and general purpose local governments, as is well illustrated by its
one person, one vote cases. These cases originate with the Court's
landmark 1964 decision in Reynolds v. Sims. 122 The Reynolds Court
examined an Alabama election scheme which apportioned voting districts
for the state legislature according to population figures from a federal
census that was over sixty years old. 123 The plaintiffs argued that their
equal protection rights were violated because the outdated apportionment
metric rendered their locales disproportionately underrepresented. 124 The
Court concluded that the Alabama scheme was unconstitutional, holding
that the Equal Protection Clause "requires that the seats in both houses of125a
bicameral state legislature must be apportioned on a population basis."'
Though "mathematical exactness or precision" was not necessary, the Court
did require a good faith effort to establish "substantial equality of
population among the various districts, so that the vote of any citizen is
26
approximately equal in weight to that of any other citizen in the State."']
In the years that followed, the Court extended Reynolds to local
governments 12 7 and community college districts that exercised general
governmental powers, 12 8 but it initially declined to rule on whether "a
special-purpose unit of government assigned the performance of functions
affecting definable groups of29 constituents more than other constituents"
should be treated differently. 1
The 1973 case Salyer Land Co. v. Tulare Lake Basin Water Storage
District1 30 marked the first time the Court considered how Reynolds's one
person, one vote formulation should be applied to special districts. The
special district at issue supplied and distributed water to a small group of
farmers. 13 1 District residents who did not own land brought the suit to
invalidate a California statute that allowed only landowners to vote in
district board elections in proportion to their acreage.132 The Court found
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

377 U.S. 533 (1964).
Id. at 538-40 (describing the state's apportionment scheme).
Id. at 537.
Id. at 577, 568.
Id. at 579.
See Avery v. Midland County, 390 U.S. 474 (1968).
See Hadley v. Junior College Dist., 397 U.S. 50 (1970).
Avery, 390 U.S at 483-84.

130. 410 U.S. 719 (1973).

131. See id. at 722-23.
132. Because the largest landowner owned enough property to give it a majority of the
voting rights, an election had not been held since 1947. Id. at 735 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
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that this water district was one of the exceptions to Reynolds's election
requirements. 133 The Court reasoned that the water district "has relatively
limited authority.... It provides no other general public services such as
schools, housing, transportation, utilities, roads, or anything else of the type
ordinarily financed by a municipal body[]... [including] hospitals.., a
fire department, police, buses, or trains."1 34 In other words, the district did
not offer government services so broad that it should be subjected to stricter
voting rules. 135 The Court's characterization of general purpose local
governments belied reality at the time. Schools, for example, for decades
have been almost universally operated by separate school districts. Only
13 6
large cities provide housing, transportation services, buses, or trains.
And more and more, general purpose local governments were handing off
responsibilities like hospitals, utilities, and roads to special districts. In
other words, the Court's perception that general purpose local governments
necessarily oversaw these activites was incorrect. Therefore, its conclusion
that the water district was free from Reynolds requirements because it had
only limited authority-a conclusion based on the Court's observation that
the district did not conduct such activities-seems fundamentally flawed.
The Court's logic became even more confused in Ball v. James,13 7 which
examined an Arizona water district similar to a Texas MUD. In that case,
residents who did not own land in the district brought suit alleging an equal
protection violation as a result of a rule that allowed only private
landowners to vote for directors. 13 8 The special district considered in Ball
was very different from the district in Salyer. At the time, the district in
Ball was one of the five largest special districts in the country in terms of
revenues and expenditures. 139 It covered 260,000 acres, made up of both
rural land and substantial portions of nine cities, including Phoenix, Mesa,
Tempe, and Scottsdale.' 40 It had the power to condemn land, sell bonds,

Most of the non-landowning residents in the district worked for one of four corporations that
owned eighty-five percent of district land, and thus argued that they had a significant
personal interest in the management of the district. See id. at 723, 726 (majority opinion).
133. Id. at 730.
134. Id. at 728-29.
135. The Court also stated that landowners should have the vote exclusively because they
alone bore the costs of maintaining the district; assessments against landowners constituted
the sole source of district revenue. See id. at 731. The Court noted that non-landowning
residents had another way to make their voices heard: They could bargain with a landowner
to vote as the landowner's proxy, a move authorized by California law at the time. See id. at
733.
136. See Lisa M. Card, One Person, No Vote? A ParticipatoryAnalysis of Voting Rights
in Special Purpose Districts,27 T. Jefferson L. Rev. 57, 65 (2004).

137. 451 U.S. 355 (1981).
138. Id. at 360 (noting that such vote was proportionally based on landowners' acreage).
Corporate and governmental landowners were not entitled to vote. Id. at 371 n.21.
139. Briffault, supra note 18, at 367 (citing Comment, Voter Restrictions in Special
Districts: A Case Study ofthe Salt River Project, 1969 Ariz. St. L.J. 636, 658).
140. William H. Riker, Democracy and Representation: A Reconciliation of Ball v.

James and Reynold v. Sims, 1 Sup. Ct. Econ. Rev. 39, 40 (1982).
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and levy taxes. 14 1 Most of the district's revenues were provided not by
42
landowners, but by the sale of electricity to half of the state's population. 1
Despite the district's significant powers, however, the Court once again
declined to apply Reynolds. The Court reasoned that the district could not
impose ad valorem property taxes or sales taxes, enact laws governing
citizen conduct, maintain streets, operate schools, or provide for sanitation,
health, or welfare services. 143 In addition, the Court said that the district's
provision of electricity-even though it affected half of the citizens in the
state and constituted ninety-eight percent of the district's revenues-was
merely incidental to the district's primary purpose of water supply and did
not constitute "a traditional element of government sovereignty."' 144 In
concluding, the Court observed that the district might never have been
created if landowners had not been assured a significant voice in its
ongoing affairs. 145 As one commentator observed, the Court looked not to
the actual scope and diversity of the district's activities, but instead focused
146
on its original stated purpose.
A blistering, four-Justice dissent criticized the majority opinion in Ball
for ignoring critical differences between the districts in Salyer and Ball and
for ignoring the significant role that the electricity supplying function
played in district operations. 147 Moreover, the dissent argued that the
provision of water and electricity was not an incidental aspect of municipal
government, but critical to maintaining health and welfare.14 8 While some
scholars agree with the dissent's view that the majority turned the vote into
a utility-serving rather than a democracy-serving function, 149 others have
said that Ball is consistent with democratic ideals. 150 For our purposes,
however, the important issue is the inconsistency and inadequacy of the
Court's analysis in determining that the districts in Salyer and Ball merited
freedom from the Reynolds rule. The special district in Ball seemed a
particularly good candidate for Reynolds scrutiny because its powers so
resembled those of general purpose local governments. Yet the Court
declined to apply Reynolds, simultaneously failing to precisely define the
difference between a general purpose local government and a special
district.

141.
142.
143.
144.
145.

Ball, 451 U.S. at 360.
Id. at 365.
Id. at 366.
Id. at 368.
Id. at 371.

146. The Supreme Court, 1980 Term-Voting in Special Purpose Districts: Ball v.
James, 95 Harv.L. Rev. 91, 181, 187 (1981).
147. Ball, 451 U.S. at 378-83 (White, J., dissenting).

148. Id. at 386.
149. See, e.g., Grant M. Hayden, The False Promise of One Person, One Vote, 102 Mich.
L. Rev.213, 216 (2003).

150. See, e.g., Riker, supra note 140, at 59 (calling Ball "fully justified interms of the
conventional theory of democracy").
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Salyer and Ball dealt with special districts that limited the vote to
landowners.151 The Court's confused classification in those cases conferred
upon special districts the power to dispense with one of our most important
voting requirements-the one person, one vote principle. The Court's
history of granting such powers to special districts that operate too much
like general purpose local governments appears misguided. A look into this
line of cases reveals why a clear distinction between special districts and
152
general purpose governments is so difficult, yet so important.
2. Sketching Out a Distinguishing Mechanism
As at least one commentator has noted, the Court's inconsistencies
demonstrate how difficult it is to categorize these entities in a meaningful
way.1 53 But we must venture to do so, because classification rules have an
impact even beyond the application of the Supreme Court's voting cases:
to district funding, tax and debt limitations, eligibility for incentive
programs, boundary-setting, and easy formation. The programmatic and
policy aims of these impacted areas may be thwarted if general purpose
local governments are allowed to masquerade as special districts.
Sketching a way to distinguish between special districts and general
purpose local governments proves difficult. One commentator has said that
the difference between these two types of government is that municipalities
have the power to define citizenship through zoning and residential
inspection, 154 but this characterization seems rather thin. Zoning powers
alone fail to definitely indicate the existence of a general purpose
government. Like the Supreme Court in Ball, state and local governments
that create special districts determine how a local government unit is
treated, primarily by reviewing the district's original stated purpose. They
do not necessarily reevaluate the special district after their powers have
evolved. Such is the case with Texas, which classifies MUDs as special
districts-because of their original water supply mission-despite their
evolving, far-reaching powers.
A sorting mechanism must focus on the actual powers granted to the
special district. What functions are central to a general purpose local
government? What functions, or set of functions, can constitute a special
district?
Certain powers are so critical to general purpose local
governments that to have them means to function like a general purpose
local government, including the powers to tax, build roads, sustain
emergency services, run elections, supply water, and exclusively control the

151. Texas MUDs do not so limit the franchise, though under these Supreme Court
precedents, no doubt they could.
152. Cf Briffault, supra note 18, at 360 ("Although... many [special districts] do not
utilize landowner voting, the proprietary cases influence contemporary understandings of
local government.").
153. Card, supra note 136, at 57.
154. Bums, supra note 15, at 8.
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geographic area. 155 These six functions might be the best place to start; no
one could argue that any of them are solely the province of private entities
or beyond the power of general purpose local governments. Special
districts with these powers, including many MUDs, should be considered to
be more like general purpose governments. In other words, they should not
receive the favorable treatment currently granted to special districts by
legislatures and courts. Other special districts-those with narrower
functions, more true to the traditional notion of a special district-might not
have all of these functions, and therefore may be more deserving of lenient
treatment. Distinguishing rules may vary by state and other conditions, but
are necessary as the number of special districts fast approaches the number
156
of general purpose local governments in America.
III. THE MYTH OF SPECIAL DISTRICT EFFICIENCY

Favorable policies for special districts are driven in part by the notion
that special districts are efficient: They solve problems within their
respective bounds at a cost to only those persons who work or live within
57
them, and they are the right size to take advantage of economies of scale.'
Clayton Gillette advances this notion in his work on local government
efficiency, arguing that local governments can best address social problems
through cooperation and small-scale policy making. 158 His work relies on
the Tieboutian public choice theory, which posits that individual sorting can
occur most efficiently when there are multiple jurisdictions with competing
packages of services. 159 Others have characterized the efficiency argument
favoring localism as permitting public policy decision making to match
60
distinctive conditions and preferences. 1
But many special districts have external effects, both positive and
negative, which reach beyond district lines or target problems that would be
better addressed by larger (or smaller) units of government. Moreover,

155. School construction and maintenance, once primarily the province of local
government, is not included in this list because now separate school districts primarily deal
with education.
156. U.S. Census Bureau, supra note 6, at v (showing that 38,967 general purpose
governments and 35,052 special districts exist in the United States).
157. Cf U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, 89th Cong.,
Metropolitan America: Challenge to Federalism 30-32, 85-86 (Comm. Print 1966)
(prepared by Bernard J. Frieden) (laying out criteria for evaluating the performance of
governmental functions in metropolitan areas to include this definition as well as five other
factors: (1) a geographic area of jurisdiction adequate for effective performance; (2) the
legal and administrative ability to perform services assigned to it; (3) responsibility for a
sufficient number of functions so that governing processes involve a resolution of conflicting
interests and a balancing of needs and resources; (4) the performance of public functions
should remain subject to public control; and (5) functions should be assigned to a level of
government that provides opportunities for active citizen participation and still permits
adequate performance).
158. See Gillette, supra note 20, at 192-94.
159. Id. at 270; see also supra text accompanying note 14.
160. Briffault, supra note 81, at 1124.
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despite their claims to efficiency, special districts spend more than central
cities to perform the same functions. 16 1 This part analyzes the myth of
special district efficiency through the MUD lens. It shows how the
proliferation of MUDs leads to governmental fragmentation, which
prevents a coherent approach to water supply-the very issue that MUDs
were created to address.
Perhaps more significantly, increased
fragmentation has had a profound effect on land use planning (or the lack
thereof) and sprawl. MUDs thus impose negative externalities on both the
municipal and regional levels, creating a kind of anticommons with an
inefficient number of competing regimes. 162 Recognizing the potentially
hazardous consequences of MUDs, this part attempts to address the
efficiency problem by evaluating several possible solutions for improving
coordination among existing MUDs.
A. MUDs, Fragmentation,and Externalities
The roots of governmental fragmentation go back a century, and
fragmentation grew in part as a result of attempts to meet the challenges of
water supply and management.
As municipal historian Jon Teaford
describes, the establishment of water systems was one of several initiatives
(along with parks, streets, hospitals, and beautification) undertaken by early
nineteenth-century cities. 163 By the late nineteenth century, cities began to
pass these duties along to new suburban governmental units. 164 Between
1910 and 1930, suburbs began to develop their own special purpose
districts; water districts were the most common. 16 5 William Fischel has
commented that he would add the "homevoter" dimension to Teaford's
explanation about the rise of the suburb (and consequently the special
district). 166 In other words, suburbanites likely advocated for special
districts because they believed that special districts ensured higher property
values. 167 State legislatures, encouraged by this expanding suburban
support, passed enabling legislation to legalize and empower these districts.
As Teaford puts it, "By the early twentieth century suburbanites had begun
168
carving up the metropolis, and the states had handed them the knife.'
161. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 19, at 1784.
162. Michael A. Heller has advanced and explained the anticommons concept. See
Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transitionfrom Marx

to Markets, 11l Harv. L. Rev. 621 (1998) (focusing on the example of empty Russian
stores).
163. Jon C. Teaford, The Municipal Revolution in America: Origins of Modem Urban
Government 1650-1825, at 102 (1975).
164. Teaford, supra note 5, at 26.
165. Id. at 78-80.
166. Fischel, supra note 57, at 212.
167. Id. at 4 (commenting that "homeowners, who are the most numerous and politically
influential group within most localities, are guided by their concern for the value of their
homes .... [T]hey will tend to choose those policies that preserve or increase the value of

their homes").
168. Teaford, supra note 5, at 31; see also U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental
Relations, supra note 157, at 39 (describing the fragmentation of the metropolitan water
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Forty years later, we have not adequately addressed the problem of
fragmentation, which has its most significant effect in areas such as water
supply and land use planning-regional, large-scale issues that are not
efficiently addressed by unrelated, small-scale governmental units like
MUDs. 169
In one famous hierarchical list, the Federal Advisory
Commission on Intergovernmental Relations in 1963 ranked common
governmental functions from "most local" to "least local": fire protection,
public education, trash disposal, libraries, police, health, urban renewal,
housing, parks, welfare, medical care, transportation, land planning, water
supply and sewage disposal, and air pollution control.' 70 Only air pollution
was characterized as "least local," and thus more deserving of a regional
response, than water supply or planning. 171 Nonetheless, in many states,
including Texas, these issues have become impossible to address on an
area-wide basis, in large part because of the fragmentation created by a
multitude of special districts. The legislation authorizing water districts in
Texas roughly follows Teaford's chronology. The Texas constitution was
amended in 1917 to allow for water districts in unincorporated areas, and
for the most part, these districts were used to enhance rural water supply in
the western part of the state. But with the growth of Texas's cities and their
attendant suburbanization, specific laws on MUDs were set forth in 1971,
anticipating their use in urban areas.
A full assessment of Texas's water supply system is beyond the scope of
this Article, but one indicator of governmental fragmentation is the
patchwork of special districts attempting to address the water supply
issue.' 72 Today, the following types of districts join nearly one thousand
MUDs in supplying water: 48 drainage districts, 66 fresh water supply
districts, 91 groundwater conservation districts, 25 irrigation districts, 46
levee improvement districts, 42 municipal management districts, 26
supply as a problem which originated in suburban areas); Pock, supra note 2, at 1 (criticizing
"the proliferation of ineffectual units of local government that, either co-existing side by side
or overlapping each other with limited territorial jurisdiction, are pitifully inadequate to the
task of rendering urban services or performing regulatory functions that peremptorily
demand area-wide jurisdiction and control").
169. As Sheryll Cashin has persuasively argued, fragmentation also exacerbates racial
and class inequalities, a topic not covered by this paper. Sheryll D. Cashin, Localism, SelfInterest, and the Tyranny of the Favored Quarter: Addressing the Barriers to New
Regionalism, 88 Geo. L.J. 1985, 2022 (2000) ("While political fragmentation inculcates a

parochialism that may discourage or distract citizens from forging potentially beneficial
regional alliances, it also institutionalizes the advantaged position of the favored quarter.").
170. See John C. Bollens & Henry J. Schmandt, The Metropolis: Its People, Politics, and

Economic Life 266 (1982) (citing U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations,
Performance of Urban Functions: Local and Areawide (1963)).
171. Id.

172. Another indicator is that three agencies oversee state water policy: the Texas Water
Development Board, which creates a water plan and provides loans and grants for water or
wastewater treatment plans and for water supply facilities; the Texas Commission on
Environmental Quality, which handles permits of water use and water pollution control and
deals with MUD applications; and the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, which enforces
the environmental provisions of the water law,
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navigation districts, 31 river authorities, 55 special utility districts, 221
water control and improvement districts (which resemble MUDs), and 18
water improvement districts. 173 Of these groups, MUDs are of particular
concern because, unlike many of the other districts, MUDs are primarily
found on the edge of urban areas and are thus more likely to overlap with
school, college, fire, emergency, counties, and other jurisdictions. MUDs
are also extremely easy to create, as Part L.A detailed, yet they are difficult
to dissolve, even if rendered obsolete by a geographically overlapping local
government performing the same functions. 174 Often, several MUDs are
established around the same time, by the same developer, for the same
development project; developers who initiate the MUD process have
recognized that they have a greater chance at maintaining control over time
by fragmenting potential opposition into many small MUDs. 175 In one
development alone, fifty-five MUDs grapple for water and other
services. 176 Once a new MUD is formed, it is not required to consider any
of the water planning issues that one might argue are critical to its mission,
much less land use issues attendant to its development. Neither are MUDs
required to form or join metropolitan coordinating bodies addressing such
issues. As a result, other local governments that must deal with MUDs'
existence often fail to integrate MUDs fully into existing water supply
systems. 177 At the same time, by having so many different districts, the
78
economies of scale in building large water systems are lost. 1
MUDs thwart land use planning as much as they thwart a coherent
approach to water supply. Indeed, MUDs tend to encourage and facilitate
sprawl,1 79 which some blame on "efforts by individual localities to capture

173. Tex. Comm'n on Envtl. Quality, supra note 10 (using figures as of March 5, 2007,
counting both active and inactive districts, with active districts outnumbering inactive
districts three to one).
174. See, e.g., Akin, supra note 64 (describing the city of Sugar Land's attempts to
dissolve a nonfunctioning water control district whose purpose was mooted after the city
began providing water and other services to the district's customers).
175. See Pate McMichael, Developer's Grand Finale Takes Shape, Gives Brownsville,
Texas, Facelift, Brownsville Herald, Aug. 13, 2004, at B3 (describing how developers within

one Brownsville subdivision used multiple MUDs to fund utility lines); Mun. Info. Servs.,
supra note 38, at 4 (describing how developers negatively viewed the takeover of the
15,000-acre Clear Lake City Water Authority by new residents).
176. Beth Kuhles, Houston:

No Plans for Annexation, Houston Chron.

(South

Montgomery County ed.), Feb. 28, 2002, at 1 (describing The Woodlands' relationship with
the City of Houston).
177. See, e.g., Zeke MacCormack, Kendall Defers to State on Utility District, San

Antonio Express-News, May 10, 2006, at 3B (discussing how Kendall County
commissioners expressed concern over the ability of a pending MUD (the Lerin Hills MUD)
to adequately treat and manage limited water resources).
178. But see Richard B. Peiser & Ron Welch, Texas Real Estate Research Ctr.,
Economies of Scale in Water and Sewer Construction Costs for New Subdivisions 2-3, 16
(1985), available at http://www.mudhatter.com/MUD-Folder/EconomiesofLot.pdf (showing

that municipal and MUD costs per water connection were comparable).
179. Bernard Siegan, the most vocal proponent of Houston's lax land use regulations, has
observed that MUDs "tend to encourage single family, as opposed to multifamily,
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economic benefits of growth while imposing costs on others in the same
region."' 80 Sprawl is low-density development, which enlarges the spatial
boundaries of a city and which has been attacked on a number of fronts.
Environmentalists allege that sprawl reduces animal habitat, threatens
ecosystems, increases impervious surface cover, depletes farmland, and
erodes soil. Social theorists argue that sprawl encourages racial and class
segregation and reduces bonding. Economists have observed that sprawl
hurts central cities by pushing jobs and tax revenues outside their bounds.
Architects denounce sprawl as aesthetically unpleasing, while planners say
that sprawl ruins chances for sensible growth. Other commentators, of
course, defend sprawl as a natural outgrowth of market needs or population
expansion. Yet most concede that sprawl is not without its costs.
While a full critique of sprawl is beyond the scope of this Article,
MUDs' easy creation and tremendous powers make it easy for developers
to build large, single-family subdivisions quickly and without central
planning. 18 1 MUDs incentivize development in unincorporated suburban
areas, instead of in urban areas: Typically, developers who build in urban
areas pay for their infrastructure by rendering exactions to local
governments. By contrast, developers who build in suburban areas can use
MUDs' bonding and taxing powers to pay fully for their infrastructure:
Developers can determine the size and location of the subsidy; MUDs
further exacerbate central cities' problems by luring wealthy homeowners
outside the city's taxing authority. 182 While MUD supporters claim that
"MUDs have been a driving force in the availability of affordable housing,
helping to build Texas neighborhoods and . . . urban communities," in
reality MUDs tend to lure high-wealth individuals away from cities,
depleting the urban tax base. 183 Neither vertical equity nor a careful
approach to land use has been a MUD priority. The myopia of developers,
and their self-interested decisions to use MUDs, contributes to sprawl's
spread and otherwise hurts central cities.
In the past few years, several cities have begun to notice MUDs' negative
effects on land development. The Fort Worth City Council has publicly
expressed doubts about "leapfrog" MUDs, which thwart the city's aims of
development." Bernard Siegan, Commentary on Redistribution of Income Through
Regulation in Housing, 32 Emory L.J. 721, 727 (1983).

180. Gillette, supra note 20, at 233.
181. See, e.g., Jeff Mosier, Officials Fight Permit to Stall Development, Rockwall-

Rowlett Morning News, July 18, 2003, at IM (describing how a developer outside of Dallas
could build over seven times as many houses in his planned subdivision because of the
financial assistance provided by MUDs).
182. See Briffault, supra note 81, at 1136; Laurie Reynolds, Intergovernmental
Cooperation, Metropolitan Equity, and the New Regionalism, 78 Wash. L. Rev. 93, 94
(2003) (describing how inequalities between localities are "the intended result of state laws
pertaining to local government formation, which allow affluent, homogenous enclaves to
form their own government and thus prevent the redistribution of resources that occurs when
wealthy and poor pay property taxes to the same general purpose municipality").
183. Legislative Planning Committee Report: The 79th Texas Legislature and Beyond,

AWBD J., Fall 2006, at 33.
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dense, mixed-use development.' 84 In Dallas, the local home builders'
association convened a summit three years ago to discuss concerns about
MUDs with local developers and officials. 185 For about a decade, Austin
fought MUD developers whose development would have strained 1an
86
important creek and put an endangered species of salamander at risk.
Rural areas find the MUD growth particularly difficult to address, as MUDs
encourage and facilitate outward development in rural areas without
coordinated controls.' 87 A bill proposed in the last legislative session by
state representatives from a growing rural area would have required MUDs
to give notice of
development plans to any nearby municipality, but stalled
88
in committee.]
Today, living in multiple overlapping jurisdictions-school districts,
special districts, emergency service zones, fire service districts, counties, or
cities-is very common. But fragmentation prevents governments from
operating at the same scale as the problems they need to address. In Texas,
state laws and policy support the proliferation of hundreds of MUDs and
other water districts, whose sheer numbers make addressing issues like land
use planning, and water planning for that matter, impossible-calling into
question whether MUDs and similar special service districts can indeed be
defended on grounds of governmental efficiency.
B. Addressing the Efficiency Gap
What can be done to mitigate the negative effects of MUDs' fragmented
proliferation? Almost no one would now call for the creation of a large
metropolitan government that includes both municipalities and special
districts (including MUDs), a solution that has been advocated for many
times in other contexts. 189
But consolidation, annexation, regional
planning, and intergovernmental cooperation may help to address the
problem. Of these, intergovernmental cooperation has been most utilized

184. Lee, supra note 70 (describing these concerns in light of several MUDs being
planned in the city's extraterritorial jurisdiction).
185. Lavigne, supra note 23.
186. See Gregory F. Brown, Legislative Branch-Of Water and Weevils: The Texas
Supreme Court Further Restricts the State Legislature's Power to Delegate to Private

Entities. FM Properties v. City of Austin, 22 S. W3d 868 (Tex. 2000), 32 Rutgers L.J. 1482,
1498 (2001).
187. See, e.g., Jim Foy, A Tale of Two Counties, Dallas Morning News (Collin County
ed.), Oct. 24, 2003, at 8B (describing how a small rural town northeast of Dallas struggled to
cope with large-scale MUD development); Mike Warren, City OKs Incentive for Home
Developer, Houston Chron. (N. Montgomery County ed.), Sept. 20, 2001, at I (describing
the City of Conroe's use of incentives to attract developers to build within city limits instead
of in rural areas).
188. Editorial, Ready?: Cities Need Help, Teamwork to Handle Staggering Growth,
Dallas Morning News (Collin County ed.), May 4, 2003, at 17B.
189. See, e.g., Anthony Downs, Brookings Inst., New Visions for Metropolitan America
170 (1994) (recognizing that creating large metropolitan governments "has almost no
political support").
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by MUDs and-despite potential inefficiencies-is likely to be adopted in
more MUD jurisdictions than any of the other solutions.
1. Consolidation
Consolidation of similar types of local governments performing the same
190
or similar functions has long been advocated by critics of fragmentation.
Consolidation aims to minimize the amount of bureaucracy, and thus
maximize the efficiency, of governments dealing with particular problems.
School districts have significantly consolidated over the last half century,
and studies have shown significant cost savings resulting from the
economies of scale. 191
Unlike school districts, special districts have increased threefold over that
same period. 192 Some states, including Texas, have provided mechanisms
by which special districts can be consolidated. 193 Two MUDs can
consolidate if each district holds an election in which electors vote in favor
of consolidation. 194 While consolidation is a relatively simple procedure,
few MUDs have taken steps to consolidate. 195 As Part II explained,
developers have disincentives to streamline their MUDs: Creating many
different districts, at least initially, helps them maintain control over the
initial stages of development. It would be surprising if political will urged
consolidation later. 196 One recent exception is The Woodlands, a
community north of Houston governed by MUDs, a road utility district, a
commercial association, a tax district, a county, a service corporation
That
offering maintenance and landscaping services, and more. 197
community, whose population has increased seventy-nine percent198over the
last decade, has begun to demand a more centralized government.
2. Annexation
Annexation has also been suggested as a solution to the fragmentation
crisis. The rationale for annexation is similar to consolidation: Once a
special district has achieved its purpose, it is more efficient to add the
190. See, e.g., U.S. Advisory Comm'n on Intergovernmental Relations, supra note 57, at

80.
191. See Marvin E. Dodson III & Thomas A. Garrett, Inefficient Education Spending in
Public School Districts: A Casefor Consolidation?,22 Contemp. Econ. Pol'y 270 (2004)
(studying Arkansas' public school system); William Duncombe & John Yinger, Does School
District Consolidation Cut Costs? (Ctr. for Policy Research, Working Paper No. 33, 2001),
availableat http://www-cpr.maxwell.syr.edu/cprwps/pdf/wp33.pdf.

192. See supra text accompanying note 6.
193. Cf Edgewood Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Kirby, 804 S.W.2d 491, 497 (Tex. 1991) (stating

that the state "[c]onstitution does not present a barrier to the general concept of tax base
consolidation," at least with regard to school districts).
194. Tex. Water Code Ann. §§ 54.728-.729 (Vernon 2002).

195. The author could find no evidence of any past consolidations.
196. See supra text accompanying note 169.
197. Lee, supra note 49.

198. Id.
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district's land to a municipality ruled by a general purpose government. If a
special district is annexed, landowners may have access to a broader range
of services than those available to them in the special district alone. Several
scholars have pointed out that when cities are elastic-that is, when they
can extend their boundaries-their growth is economically healthier and
less plagued by segregation. 199 It has been said that without having the
ability to expand their boundaries easily, Texas cities would not be the
flourishing, growing cities that they are today. 20 0 Annexation powers are
20 1
particularly important since Texas cities receive little state aid.
In Texas, municipalities' powers of annexation have been a controversial
issue. For many years, cities abused their annexation powers, adding
outlying subdivisions at will, and often by surprise. In 1963, the state
legislature passed the Municipal Annexation Act to limit cities' annexation
powers and to mandate a public hearing before proceedings begin. 202 Now,
annexation processes differ depending on how a city is designated: general
law or home rule. Most large cities are home rule cities, which means that
they can annex land in their extraterritorial jurisdiction without consent,
depending on the terms of their charter. 20 3 General law cities, on the other
hand, must get landowners' consent to annex, except in limited
circumstances. 20 4 Cities must have a three-year annexation plan, which can
be amended. 20 5 Except in certain circumstances, no land can be added
206
unless it has been indicated on the plan at least three years in advance.
During this three-year time period, cities and MUDs often try to phase in
annexation by gradually shifting the burden of providing services to the
city.2 07 Any sparsely populated area can, by landowner petition, ask to be
annexed to a municipality. 20 8 Through annexation of infrastructurebuilding districts like MUDs, cities can avoid the cost, management, and

199. Downs, supra note 189, at 169 (stating that "cities which can annex growing areas
will do better than those that must watch growth move beyond their boundaries" (citing
David Rusk, Cities Without Suburbs (1993))).
200. See Scott N. Houston, Municipal Annexation in Texas: "Is it Really That
Complicated?"
10
(2004),
available
at
http://www.tml.org/legal-pdf/ANNEXATION111704.pdf (claiming that "[i]f San Antonio,

for example, had the same boundaries it had in 1945, it would contain more poverty and
unemployment tha[n] Newark, New Jersey").
201. See id. at 11.

202. For a history of annexation in Texas, see id.
203. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 43.021 (Vernon 1999).
204. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 43.033 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2006).
205. Id. § 43.052(c).
206. Id. § 43.033.
207. See, e.g., Press Release, City of Austin, City, Lost Creek MUD Will Continue to
Negotiate Final Service Plan, U.S. State News (Aug. 15, 2006), available at
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/news/2006/lostcreekjinput.htm (describing how the 789-acre Lost
Creek MUD negotiated levels of service, operation, and infrastructure maintenance with the
City of Austin during the interim three-year pre-annexation period).
208. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 43.028 (Vernon 1999).
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liabilities of constructing new infrastructure. 20 9 Moreover, cities can avoid
2 10
the risks associated with real estate development in their urban fringes.
Despite its advantages and attractions, however, there are a number of
barriers to using widespread annexation as a solution to fragmentation. One
challenge to the annexation solution is that a city may annex land only
within its extraterritorial jurisdiction. 2 1 1 Most MUDs, however, are outside
cities' extraterritorial jurisdiction, placing them beyond the city's power to
annex. 2 12 Other limitations on annexation abound in Texas law. A
municipality in a county of between 800,000 and 1,300,000 people, for
example, cannot annex part of a MUD unless ninety percent or more of all
facilities have been installed and completed and the municipality assumes
the pro rata share of the bond indebtedness, making the prospect of
annexation somewhat less attractive. 2 13 An annexing city cannot tax MUD
property owners to subsidize the cost of absorbing them, and in 1989, the
Texas legislature prohibited cities and municipally owned water and sewer
utilities from requiring that MUDs assess a surcharge against users of the
water and sewer service as a precondition to annexing the MUD. 2 14 Under
existing law, cities may skip over low-performing MUDs and annex MUDs
with high tax bases-an approach that may make certain annexations more
attractive, but hardly offers a solution to the problem of fragmentation and
inefficiency.
Moreover, MUD residents tend to view annexation with suspicion,
perceiving annexation to result in increased taxes and greater burdens
placed on them by central city problems.2 1 5 This fear may be well founded,
209. See Cherie Bell, Offer by Developer Praised, Mesquite Morning News, Feb. 20,
2003, at IT (citing the City of Mesquite's approval of a MUD established by a developer
willing to "spend millions for water and sewer lines that could one day provide a significant
revenue stream for the city" through annexation); Darrell Preston, Austin's Powers: LaidBack Texas Town Seeks Ways to Cope with Dizzy Growth, Bond Buyer, Feb. 17, 1998, at 1
(citing Austin's incorporation of ten bond-financed MUDs to expand its tax base and keep
up with growth).
210. Note that a city has control over its extraterritorial jurisdiction through platting and
subdivision regulations, if extended by ordinance, though zoning regulations and
plumbing/electric codes cannot be extended. See Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.2052 (Vernon
Supp. 2006) (a MUD is not required to adopt a plumbing code); Robert R. Ashcroft &
Barbara Kyle Balfour, Home Rule Cities andMunicipalAnnexation in Texas: Recent Trends
and Future Prospects, 15 St. Mary's L.J. 519, 528 (1984).
211. The extraterritorial jurisdiction of municipalities includes 0.5 miles if the
municipality has fewer than 5000 inhabitants, 1 mile if 5000 to 24,999 inhabitants, 2 miles if
25,000 to 49,999 inhabitants, 3.5 miles if between 50,000 and 99,999 inhabitants, and 5
miles if 100,000 or more inhabitants. Tex. Loc. Gov't Code Ann. § 42.021 (Vernon 1999).
212. Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 11, at 10 (describing the location of most Houston-area
MUDs as being outside Houston's extraterritorial jurisdiction).
213. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.813 (Vernon Supp. 2006).
214. Tex. Water Code Ann § 13.0421 (Vernon 2000).
Meeting,
Council
City
Log of Austin
e.g.,
Closed Caption
215. See,
http://www.ci.austin.tx.us/council/2006/council_08142006.htm (last visited Nov. 1, 2006)
(chronicling the dialogue between officials of the City of Austin and from the Lost Creek
MUD about the city's annexation plans, with MUD officials urging that the City provide a
more detailed catalogue of costs and benefits).
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given how annexation has affected services in former MUDs. 2 16 Some
MUDs have even created pacts with the city in whose extraterritorial
jurisdiction they lie to stall or prevent annexation. 2 17 To make matters
worse, MUD residents might not even know that they live in land capable
of being annexed. 2 18 In sum, while annexation may be an attractive
solution to the problem of governmental fragmentation in theory, it is not
always easy, and it is not a panacea.
3. Regional Planning
Regionalism has enjoyed an upsurge over the last fifteen years, and
scholars, policy makers, and planners have come to view it as a solution for
local governmental fragmentation. 21 9 Even local government boosters like
220
Gerald Frug recognize that a regional approach is sometimes necessary.
Put simply,
[r]egionalism promises to reduce the inefficiencies related to fragmented
government, reduce distributional inequality between cities and their
suburbs, allow local public goods to be provided in a comprehensive
manner consistent with scale economies rather than on the basis of
fortuitous boundaries that bear only coincidental
relationship to ideal
22 1
service areas, and limit ethnic segregation.
There may be costs, however, to a regionalist regime: Those who favor
decentralized government argue that regionalism eliminates competition
among localities, reduces preference satisfaction by homogenizing services,
frustrates exit, and hinders political participation. 222 Despite its costs,
regionalism continues to be one of the most frequently suggested solutions
to the governmental fragmentation problem.
A regional water or land use planning scheme, however, is not likely to
be successful in addressing the problems posed by MUDs, given the
realities of the Texas political and legal culture. To be more deliberate
216. See Renee C. Lee, Annexed Kingwood Split on Effects, Houston Chron., Oct. 8,
2006, at A21 (describing how firefighting services in a former MUD district diminished after

annexation to the City of Houston, from eighty firefighters to thirty, and from twelve pieces
of equipment to nine).
217. See Lee, supra note 49 (describing the 1999 pact between the City of Houston and
several MUDs located within The Woodlands, a Houston suburb, which prohibited
annexation until 2011).
218. See Julie Mason, Two House Bills Focus on Annexation: Measures Seek to Ensure
that Buyers Know Status of Their Property, Houston Chron., Jan. 15, 1999, at 31A

(describing the rationale for two proposed bills placing the onus on MUDs to inform buyers
whose property is within a city's extraterritorial jurisdiction that their property is annexable).
219. Reynolds, supra note 182, at 109-11 (observing that "[t]he 1990s saw a resurgence
of regionalist proposals").
220. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 19, at 1790-92 (sketching out the

powers and rationale for a regional legislature). But see Ford, supra note 20, at 1174
(opposing the creation of more regional governments).
221. Clayton P. Gillette, The Conditions of Interlocal Cooperation,21 J.L. & Pol. 365,
365 (2005).
222. Id.
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about the way new MUDs form, for example, the legislature could
strengthen oversight by the body that approves district creation, the TCEQ,
and require the TCEQ to evaluate the creation of a MUD against a
statewide development plan. But strengthening TCEQ oversight over the
creation and placement of districts is likely to be met by opposition from
the powerful MUD and developer lobbies.
More significantly, regional water or land use planning is simply not part
of the Texas ethos: The few regional solutions offered by state law are
underutilized or poorly conceived. For example, the state was divided into
sixteen water planning regions in 1997, and the Texas Water Development
Board has been charged with preparing a state water plan. 22 3 Yet such
efforts have fallen short in both implementation and design, no doubt
affected by the creation of multiple types of regional water authorities. A
MUD or a city can petition the state for the creation of a regional plan
implementation agency "to encourage and promote regional planning by
cities and to facilitate the implementation of areawide, systematic solutions
to water, waste disposal, drainage, and other problems."2 24 Another kind of
regional district can be created under Chapter 59 of the Water Code to
acquire and sell water, acquire equipment, operate facilities for sewer and
22 5
wastewater treatment, and more.
Very few of these regional agencies have been successful, due to a strong
status quo bias and reluctance to yield power to such authorities. Those that
have been created tend to work poorly. The North Harris County Regional
Water Authority (NHCRWA), for example, coordinates about 140
Houston-area water districts, mostly MUDs, and aims to reduce their
dependence on groundwater. 226 The NHCRWA earns much of its income
from member MUDs and engages in construction projects to harness
surface water from Houston-area lakes for sale to MUDs. 2 27 Supporters of
the NHCRWA discourage the authority from entering into any contracts
with the City of Houston. 2 28 The city has long opposed the activities of the
NHCRWA, in part because the city has invested $2 billion in a regional
223. See Tex. Water Dev. Bd., State Water Plan (2007), available at
http://rio.twdb.state.tx.us/publications/reports/State-Water-Plan/2007/2007StateWaterPlan/2
007StateWaterPlan.htm. Sixteen regional water plans dating back to 2001 are available at
http://www.twdb.state.tx.us/rwpg/main-docs/regional-plans-index.htm.
224. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 54.037(a) (Vernon 2002).
225. Tex. Water Code Ann. § 59.004 (Vernon 2004).
226. See N. Harris County Reg'l Water Auth., MUDs by NHCRWA District (2005),
http://www.nhcrwa.com/pdf/2005/MUDS-BY_R WA_DISTRICT.pdf.
227. N. Harris County Reg'l Water Auth., Operating Budget Planning Report, Fiscal Year
2006, available at http://www.nhcrwa.com/budget/2005/2006%20Budget%20Master/20%20Adopted%201 l_7_05.pdf (reporting that of NHCRWA's $14 million income in 2005,
about $11 million was from pumpage fees paid by MUD member districts; expenses totaled
just $5 million and included $190,000 for water purchases, $1.4 million for management
services, and $132,000 for lobbying services).
228. See Kim Canon et al., Water Among Issuesfor Area Voters, Houston Chron., Feb. 2,

2002, at 37A (describing a political action committee initiated by a state senator and a
NHCRWA member which sought to ensure the authority's independence from Houston).
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water system and had included north Harris County in its water planning. 229
While the NHCRWA helps to coordinate MUDs, then, it actually hinders
coordination regarding regional water supply.
4. Intergovernmental Cooperation
As an alternative to regionalism, intergovernmental cooperation might be
said to induce localities to account for and internalize the effects they
impose beyond their bounds 2 30 or to solve service delivery problems
without forfeiting political independence. 2 31 Cooperation among MUDs,
and between MUDs and general purpose local governments, has already
been occurring. 2 32 To improve service quality, MUDs may contract with
neighboring MUDs and officials in the relevant county or city body.2 33
Sometimes MUDs buy water from nearby cities. 234 A few MUDs overlap
with other kinds of water districts, which act as "master districts" that
provide water, sewer, and drainage services to a small group of MUDs. 2 35
The costs for these master districts are apportioned to the MUDs or are paid
for by revenue bonds backed by specific performance contracts with the
2 36
MUDs.
Other MUDs use interlocal agreements with counties or city governments
to exchange non-water-related services. 237 A MUD outside of the
municipality of Missouri City, for example, has coordinated with the City
Council of Missouri City to build a fire station, with the city providing
operational support and site approval and the MUD paying for the site
acquisition, design, and construction. 23 8 The City of Houston has offered
other strategic partnerships with MUDs, sometimes called limited purpose
annexation agreements, in which the city provides certain services (like
health inspections, code enforcement, police, and fire protection). In turn,
the city adds one cent to the sales tax already levied, and the MUD and the

229. See Julie Mason, Lindsay Uncorks Planfor Water District, Houston Chron., Apr. 7,
1999, at A17.

230. Gillette, supra note 20, at 269 (arguing that "metropolitan problems are amenable to
cooperative solutions without further governmental centralization").
231. Briffault, supra note 14, at 378.
232. Texas enables MUDs to enter into contracts and other arrangements with other
governments. See supra text accompanying note 90.
233. Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 38, at 4.
234. The City of Houston sells $70 million in water to area MUDs, seventy-five percent
more than it did five years ago. Dan Feldstein, Plan Criticized by Tax Activists May Bring
Relief, Houston Chron., May 4, 2006, at B1.

235. Mun. Info. Servs., supra note 11, at 1.
236. Id.
237. See, e.g., Anderson Mill Mun. Utility Dist., What Is a Municipal Utility District?,
http://www.ammud.org/Whatis.htm (last visited Mar. 20, 2007) (describing how the
Anderson Mill MUD had several interlocal contracts with the county government which let
the county handle road construction and emergency medical services and the MUD handle
landscaping and maintenance duties for its central parkway).
238. Zheng, supra note 88.
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city split the new revenue. 239 This type of coordination is the exception,
240
rather than the rule.
While intergovernmental cooperation may be a step in the right direction,
it has the potential to work in reverse, with too many individual agreements
worsening the fragmentation problem. Both Gerald Frug and Laurie
Reynolds have discussed the counterintuitive claim that intergovernmental
cooperation may have an anti-regional impact. 24 1 Reynolds states, "[B]y
allowing independent local governments to participate in metropolitan
governance only when it benefits their own short-term interests,
intergovernmental cooperation may exacerbate the metropolitan regional
inequality that [a regionalist approach] seeks to eliminate." 242 Frug agrees
that interlocal contracts' piecemeal method complicates the coordination of
local government activities and weakens public participation. 2 43 Finally,
the beneficiaries of interlocal cooperation may not be entirely clear:
Teaford's historical analysis notes that intergovernmental cooperation in the
water supply context has primarily benefited outlying areas, not central
cities. 244 The potential negative effects of cooperation must be considered
in light of the alternatives available to addressing the gap between the
perception and reality of special districts' efficiency.
CONCLUSION

Modern local government law strives to answer whether a certain unit of
government is optimal. By asking this question of Texas's municipal utility
districts, this Article attempts to advance our understanding of the
optimality of the special district. Government policies facilitate the creation
and empowerment of such districts, and certain abstract arguments lend
support to such policies. These underlying justifications, however, must be
reevaluated. This Article argues that special districts like MUDs are not
necessarily as democratic, narrowly tailored, or as efficient as either
theorists or existing public policy might suggest.
239. Ron Nissimov, Houston Growing with Use of MUDs, Houston Chron., June 14,
2004, at All (describing this process and noting that some MUDs use the revenues from
sales tax to lower property taxes, while others use it to build infrastructure); see also Kim
Jackson, City Officials Pitch Service Plan for FM 1960 Area, Houston Chron. (Jersey
Village/Northwest Harris County/Cy-Fair/Copperfield/Fairfield ed.), July 14, 2005, at 1
(describing the fifty-fifty sales tax split between the city of Houston and certain northwest
Harris County MUDs).
240. Of the several hundred MUDs eligible for the city of Houston strategic partnership
agreements involving split sales taxes, only a few dozen have entered into such agreements.
Nissimov, supra note 239.
241. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 19, at 1781-88; Reynolds, supra
note 182, at 98.
242. Reynolds, supra note 182, at 123.
243. Frug, Beyond Regional Government, supra note 19, at 1785.
244. Teaford, supra note 5, at 80 (adding that cooperation had negative effects on central
cities, because "cooperation undermined the competitive advantage that the central city
traditionally had enjoyed with regard to public services ....Metropolitan cooperation... []
did much more for the suburb").
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This Article does not advocate dispensing with special districts
altogether. Despite numerous flaws, the special district is worth keeping.
They serve public aims: They provide services to geographic areas that
other governments might not serve, manage critical public goods (such as
water), and bring attention to specific, discrete problems. With their
individualized service offerings, they provide alternatives to consumers
looking for new places to live or work. But they are not perfect. Given
special districts' continuing proliferation across the country over the last
sixty years, more scholars should take up study of special districts. We
must now ask whether we can create measures to better assess their impact,
to fix them so that they do not create negative spillover effects, and to tailor
24 5
their powers to serve both democratic and functional purposes.
Our collective complacency about special districts is starting to change,
especially in the American West, where special districts have spread most
quickly. 24 6 And it should change more still. This Article has wrestled with
the MUD example to pin down the truth about special districts. More
investigation can shed light on the increasingly important, and always
complex, special district.

245. See Downs, supra note 189, at 182 ("[Tlhe major shortcoming of local governments
in metropolitan areas is that their failure to take account of the welfare of each area as a
whole is undermining the long-run viability of American society. Unless Americans
confront this reality by creating institutions that operate at the same scale as their major
problems, their problems will only get worse.").
246. Liebmann, supra note 16, at 110-11 (noting that by 1992, five western statesCalifornia, Nevada, New Mexico, Oregon, and Washington-had appointed state
commissions to reduce the number of special districts being created).

